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The objective of this thesis is to examine the
structure and process of budget formulation and execution of
the USMC tactical air flying hour program. It looks at how
flight hour requirements are translated to budget requests,
how the allocated funds are managed, and examines methods of
evaluating the effectiveness of the program. Data and
information was collected by field visits and interviews
with program managers, funds administrators, SecNav
analysts, representatives of the Fiscal Division and
Aviation branchs at Headquarters Marine -Corps, and fleet
operations and fiscal managers.
The basic conclusion from this study is the current
program is underfunded because it is incorrectly stated.
The efficiency of the program can be improved to increase
the effectiveness of the program. Of the alternatives
presented some are relatively minor and could provide some
improvement to the current system, while others are far more
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Marine Corps aviation plays an integral role in our
nation's defense. The nation has made a sizeable investment
to provide the Marine Corps with high quality, affordable,
state of the art aircraft. Congress provides the resources
to support the program and the Marines are expected to
manage those resources through sound fiscal and operational
responsibility so as to get the maximum return on the
investment. This thesis looks at the program established to
plan for and manage the funds that support the day-to-day
operations of Marine Aviation. The cost, ef fectineness , and
efficiency of the program are examined to determine what, if
any, changes can be made to maximize the return on the
nation's investment.
Providing and managing the resources required to
support Marine Corps aviation operations is challenging and
frustrating as the process is complex, difficult to measure,
highly competitive, and difficult to understand. A general
description of the program, appropriately called the Flying
Hour Program (FHP), will provide the background for
discussion of the complexities and related problems.
Marine Aviation is the extension of Naval Air Forces
ashore, providing support to amphibious surface and ground
forces. As a part of Naval Aviation, all funding for
procurement and operations of Marine Corps aircraft is
provided by the Navy. The Flying Hour Program is a
Department of the Navy program to manage the budget line
items that go into flight operations. These line items, or
Operating Target (OPTAR) Functional Categories (OFC's), are
part of the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M.N)
Appropriation that provide the day to day operating funds
for the General Purpose Forces* of the Navy - including
Marine Corps Aviation assets. The funds are used for fuel,
oil and lubricants, flight equipment, maintenance, and spare
parts.
The method used to define both the Navy and Marine
flying hour requirements is based in the computation of the
number of flying hours required to support what is called
Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) for any particular type
aircraft and a fixed ratio of crews per aircraft or Crew
Seat Ratio (CSR). However, the PMR relates only to
TACAIR/ASW aircraft since other types of aircraft need to be
* U.S. naval forces are divided into two categories by
basic general capabilities. They are the Strategic Forces
made up of fleet ballistic missile submarines and the
General Purpose Forces which includes all other forces.
Navy/Marine aviation falls under General Purpose Forces and
is further divided into three groups: (1) Tactical
Air/Antisubmarine Squadrons (TACAIR/ASW); (2) Fleet
Readiness Squadrons (FRS); and (3) Fleet Support Squadrons.
The TACAIR/ASW Squadrons are combat squadrons and are those
that can be deployed aboard ship and to forward deployment
bases. Marine Corps TACAIR squadrons are organizationally
assigned to Marine Air Groups (MAG ' s ) . [Ref . 1]
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funded at 100$ and operate on relatively fixed numbers of
flying hours.
Being a part of the Department of the Navy (DON)
structure creates both simplifications and complexities for
the Marine Corps program managers. Fiscal responsibility
and administration for the 0&M,N appropriation above the
Fleet Marine Force level is entirely the Navy's. Marine
commanders do not have legal or accounting responsibility
as set forth by U.S. Codes 1301 and 1517** for the assigned
"Blue Dollars" as the 0&M,N funds are called. Above the
Fleet Marine Force level there is minimal Marine Corps
representation.
These very simplifications actually create other
problems. Until mid-1985 there was no Marine Corps
representation in the budget process that could speak for or
defend Marine Corps interests in the "Blue Dollar" account.
Because of differences in Navy and Marine Corps reporting
procedures there is an equivalent increase in the paperwork
in the Fleet commands to maintain two different systems -
the "Blue Dollar" accounts and the Marine Corps "Green
Dollar" accounts. Because they are not Operating
Budget(OPBUD) holders for "Blue Dollars", Force Commanders
do not have the same authority and flexibility as they do
with the Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps( 0&M ,MC ) or
** Formerly Section 3678, Revised Statutes( R. S. ) , 31 U.S.
Code 628, and Section 3679, R.S., 31 U.S. Code 665.
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"Green Dollars" allotment. This also creates a separate and
additional chain of command with which a Force Commander
must contend.
Until the early 1980's the Marine Corps was unable to
execute the budgeted program for various reasons. As a
result there was always more than enough hours available and
the Flying Hour Program was not very active. The Navy
normally ended up flying -the hours the Marines could not
use. During 1981-1982 most of the deficiencies were
eliminated or reduced, and the excess funding began to
dwindle to the point that there needed to be better planning
and management of resources. With the onset of a tight
Flying Hour Program a new problem arose - that of the cost
per flight hour. The planning documents did not accurately
reflect the real cost per hour. Commanders had also been
realigning large numbers of flight hours among the various
type/model/series (TMS) aircraft which had resulted in an
imbalance between flying hours and the necessary material
support. Up to this point the Marines had been basically
managing the bottom line, but with attention now focused on
cost per hour they were forced into management by TMS. As a
result the FY 1983 program was plagued by pricing problems
in fuel consumption and maintenance costs which forced
reductions in flying hours in order to finance higher costs.
As the managers of the program became more experienced
and proficient and the program was more finely tuned new
1 2
problems and complexities surfaced. Some have been
resolved, some will eventually be worked out or reduced, and
others will always exist. The underlying difficulty is
being able to correctly identify, define, state, and sell
the flying hour requirements for Marine TACAIR.
B. OBJECTIVES
The basic objective of this thesis is to examine and
evaluate the planning, funding, and execution of those
elements that provide the direct support of th U.S. Marine
Corps' flight hour program, and to determine where changes
or improvements can be made to increase the effectiveness of
the Flying Hour Program. This is approached through the
isolation and discussion of current problems within, and
externalities that influence the system and provide
alternatives that might make the program more effective.
During the formulation stage of this study the original
idea was to examine the feasibility of making the Marine
Corps flight hour program independent of the Navy program,
and make the program part of the 0&M,MC allocation. This
solution is an oversimplification of the problem and
although it would eliminate or lessen many of the problems
it is impractical and would never occur. Therefore the
scope of the study was expanded to look at a number of
smaller alternatives to problems within the current system.
Some are relatively minor and would merely require expansion
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or changes in current procedures while others are somewhat
more ambitious and would create more impact on the system.
A basic and critical question is what are the goals of
the flight hour program and does the current system provide
the resources required to those objectives? The study
compares the objectives to the criteria used to state the
requirements of the program and discusses the compatibility
of the program with the objectives. The current
requirements are understated or incorrectly stated and
therefore do not correctly establish the needs of the
program, subsequently the program ends up being underfunded
and the goals of the operating forces are not met. This is
probably the major shortcoming of the program today. The
study looks at these areas and examines what the impact to
combat readiness may be.
Problems within the administration of the program that
impact on overall efficiency are examined with the idea of
improving the administration of the program to make it more
efficient. Two areas in particular are the funds flow and
training of accounting personnel at the Group level.
There has been criticism from Congress and high level
analysts that the Marine Corps does not utilize simulators
enough in place of expensive flight hours. The greater use
of simulators to replace actual flight hours is looked at as
an alternative to increase readiness without a equivalent
increase in the allocation.
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Although not one of the main objectives, the question
of the evaluation system used to measure readiness is
considered along with the other questions. Readiness is the
ultimate goal of the program and how that readiness is
measured to provide feedback to the system is important.
The question is raised as to whether the current measurement
system is a realistic gauge of the ability of TACAIR
squadrons to go to war. Because those measurements are used
in the budgetary process as justification they have an
impact on allocations, especially if the credibility of the
system is challenged.
As the research on this thesis progressed it became
apparent that although there is a great deal of information
regarding the Flying Hour Program, there is no one source or
comprehensive material available. The majority of the
background and historical material is in the heads of the
individuals that have been involved in the evolution to the
program. This thesis has been expanded somewhat in the
background areas so as to provide a source about the
background of the Marine Corps Flying Hour Program.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Is the Marine Corps Flying Hour Program as effective as
it can be with a given cost? If not, how can it be made
more effective? By improving the efficiency of the
budgeting and/or execution so that the taxpayer gets more
15
for his money? By increasing the cost of the program -
making more money available to execute the program? Is the
measurement system used to determine effectiveness adequate?
Do we know what we are paying for?
These are rather complex questions and because of the
rather subjective, and in some cases - political, nature of




The theme of this study is the Marine Corps Flying Hour
Program. The FHP is concerned with the day-to-day
operational costs to fly an aircraft and the dollar and hour
totals required to meet the readiness objectives of the
Marine Corps. The operational costs, funded as part of the
0&M,N allocation, are made up of fuel, flight equipment,
maintenance, and depot level repairables (DLR). The study
is limited to the costs of tactical air (TACAIR) which
account for 71% of the dollars in the program. The other
requirements funded in the program are a relatively fixed
number of flight hours for undergraduate and fleet readiness
squadrons (FRS) training pipelines. These hours are based
upon a fixed number of syllabus hours and student loads.
The remaining hours are the result of tasking by higher
authorities for strategic and fleet support aircraft. The
16
reserve force flight hour program will not be considered as
it is funded as part of the 0&M,NR appropriation.
The flying hour program is changing and dynamic. When
the study was initially undertaken one of the major
weaknesses of the program was that there was no Marine Corps
representation at the Department of the Navy or OSD levels.
Since that time representatives from the Office of the DCS
for Aviation and Fiscal division at Headquarters Marine
Corps have been assigned to monitor the "Blue Dollars" or
flight hour money in the 0&M,N allocation. There are other
areas that may be discussed that are no longer factors in
the program or may be resolved in the near future. The
affects of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill will not be
considered.
The Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) gets the
majority of the attention in the study. FMFPAC has the
greater number of assets with two aircraft wings and the
IstMARBDE. FMFPAC has over 40$ more aircraft than FMFLANT
and had a $76M greater budget in FY85. A research trip was
made to FMFPAC Headquarters and the majority of the data and
input to the study came from FMFPAC sources. Because of the
time and distance separation from San Diego (headquarters of
Naval Air Forces, Pacific) and Washington, D.C., FMFPAC
seems to be somewhat more sensitive to some of the problems
within the program, and therefore a better subject to focus
on for the study.
17
The bias of this thesis is towards the Marine Corps.
The majority of the inputs were from Marine Corps sources
and seen from that perspective. Due to limitations in time
and travel not everyone with an interest in the program
could be interviewed, especially at the higher Navy levels.
E. METHODOLOGY
The primary source of data and information for this
thesis was through interviews. There is little available in
the literature that provides specific information on the
Marine Corps Flying Hour Program. As the program is very
dynamic the most current information had an affect on the
study. Some problems that existed in May 1985 did not
exist six months later. The idea of examining the Marine
FHP was proposed by FMFPAC because of concerns over the
funds flow and control of FMF aviation operating resources.
A research trip to FMFPAC Headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii
provided the introduction to the Marine Corps FHP and the
background for this study.
The next trip was to Washington, D.C. and an
opportunity to interview several of the key figures in the
program. Mr. Greg Barber, NAVCOMPT analyst, and LtCol R.K.
Ward, OP-501 (acquisition and budget), provided substantial
insight and information. This trip also provided the
opportunity to visit OP-51 , the Flying Hour Program
Coordinator, where the Operations Plan (OP-20) is developed,
18
and to visit the Aviation Plans and Policy (APP) branch at
Headquarters, Marine Corps.
A research trip to Southern California was made to
visit the Comptroller at AirPac, the 3rd Marine Aircraft
Wing and Marine Aircraft Group 16 at MCAS(H) Tustin. This
particular trip was particularly insightful as it presented
views as seen by the operators in the field at the group and
squadron level
.
In October, 1985 a Flying Hour Conference was sponsored
by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation in Washington,
D.C.. Principal participants in the Marine FHP attended to
discuss problems affecting the program. This conference
provided invaluable information to the study. It also
provided the opportunity to update previous interviews and
interview others from commands that would have been
impractical to visit.
Studies, talking papers, directives, data files,
messages, and planning documents were made available all
along the way and this provided the bulk of the literature
type information.
From all the information that was collected a common
thread was looked for and a compilation made from the many
different ideas and opinions. It became apparent that in
some instances what may have been a problem to one command
may not have been a problem to another. Because of this a
19
discussion of a problem may be a little colored towards the
individual that expressed concern over it.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The Marine Corps Flying Hour Program is underfunded and
understated. Considering the present attitude of the
Congress and nation in general towards spending and
deficits, increasing the funding would not be a probable
solution. There would most likely have to be a change in
priorities and some other program sacrificed in the interest
of an O&M program. There is, however, sufficient
justification to attempt an increase in funding requests.
There are also areas that can be made more efficient so the
return on a finite cost can be raised.
Because the Marine Corps was unable to execute the
budgeted program for so long when they were finally able to
do so the requirements were found to be incorrectly stated
and underfunded. Bureaucracy is slow and resistant to
change so the Marine Corps has had a hard time getting the
requirements correctly stated. The Navy and Marine corps
differ in some areas of operations and administration
procedures and stating two different requirements with one
plan can lead to misunderstanding and cuts that affect
readiness
.
The current method of stating requirements by Primary
Mission Readiness (PMR) is not adequate for either the Navy
20
or the Marine Corps programs. Although there are several
alternatives to utilize a criteria that better states the
requirements the wheels of change have been slow.
Although the FMF commanders perform many of the tasks
and have nearly all the expertise on 0&M,N funded FMF
aviation, they do not have any authority or responsibility
for the funds. The FMF commander is merely a conduit of
funds from the OPBUD holder at CNAP/CNAL (Commander Naval
Air Forces, Pacific/Atlantic) to the OPTAR holders.
Changing the funds flow so that they follow the operational
chain of command from the Fleet Commanders in Chief directly
to the FMF Commanders might improve the capability of the
FMF's to execute their budget.
Although the Marine Corps has been criticized for not
using flight simulators more there is justification in
TACAIR for not using them more.
There seems to be a drop off in understanding the
Marine FHP at the extreme ends of the system. At the upper
end (Congress, OSD , and NAVCOMPT) there is a difficulty in
understanding the requirements from an operators point of
view, especially as the Marine FHP is buried in the larger
Navy program. At the lower end ('groups and squadrons) the
operators have a hard time understanding the fiscal side of
the program. They see readiness, deployments, operations,
and flight hour goals and don't appreciate the dollars and
control systems that can affect those objectives.
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One weak link in the management of the program occurs
in the accounting at the Group level. The individual
program may be only as strong as the Group fiscal officer.
Marines assigned have training in aviation supply and may
not be familiar with Blue Dollar management. There may be
as many different systems as there are MAG's. Additionally,
they are reporting to two different systems; up the Marine
chain for Green Dollars, and to both the Navy responsible
center and the Marine chain for Blue Dollars. This makes
excessive paperwork. If the FMF commanders were OPBUD
holders the reporting system could be simplified and tied in
more with the Green Dollar reporting thus giving the Group
through FMF fiscal managers better control of the program.
Blue Dollar accounting should be added to current
formal training programs for entry level supply clerks and
officers. At present neither officer or enlisted financial
accounting personnel receive training in 0&M,N accounting
and must be trained on the job. This substantially delays
the time a new clerk or supervisor can become effective and
degrades the productive output of personnel who must serve
as instructors.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This study is divided into six chapters.
Chapter one provides an introduction to the
organizational structure and brief background of the study.
22
Chapter two provides a more detailed background of the
program. Included is a detailed description of the
structure of the Flying Hour Program, a description of the
objectives of Marine Corps aviation, and a history of the
program.
Chapter three discusses cost versus effectiveness and
looks at the measurement system used to determine the return
on the tax dollars.
Chapter four describes and analyzes the problems with
the program. It looks at three general areas; stating the
flying hour requirement, program managemant, and the
understanding of the program at the different levels of the
system.
G-hapter five provides alternatives to the problems
discussed in chapter four.
Chapter six presents conclusions drawn from the study
and considers whether the return on the investment can be
improved through various alternatives. These alternatives
include increasing the investment, leaving the investment
alone and improving the quality of the return, or by leaving
it alone. It may be possible that the return just cannot be
measured in terms of dollars invested and whatever
alternative is selected cannot be evaluated.
23
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides the details and structure of the
Flying Hour Program to establish the background for the
evaluation of the research question. In this chapter the
following will be discussed:
* A general description of the Navy/Marine Corps
Flying Hour Program to include what it attempts to
accomplish, and how it works, is funded, and is
managed
.
* The objectives of Marine Aviation.
* The history of the Marine Corps Flying Hour Program
and where it is today.
A. THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM
1 • Department of Defense
The Department of Defense does not have a single,
autonomous flying hour program. It is a compilation of
three military departments' separate flying activities. The
operation and administration of flying hour programs are
service unique and affect a number of separate budget line
items. An integral part of each program is training and
maintaining proficient aviators. Pilot proficiency in each
service is, generally, a measure of combat readiness.
However, what functions a "combat ready" pilot must perform
will vary between the services.
24
The Air Force FHP is an aggregate of the programs
developed by the three major operating commands; Tactical
Air Force (TAF), Strategic Air Command (SAC), and Military-
Airlift Command. The funds requested to finance the Air
Force program is based on factors of aviation fuel, supply
requirements and depot level maintenance. MAC is somewhat
unique as the principal means of financing operations is
through the Airlift Service Fund. The fund is reimbursed by
airlift users and in effect the program is self-sufficient.
In FY85 the projected FHP budget had been $9.67 billion.
The Air Force uses several methods to rate pilot
proficiency depending on the major command to which a pilot
is assigned.
The Army FHP is an assimilation of separate programs
developed by the Army's major commands (MACOMS). The only
restraint is to fly within the total authorized flying
hours. Flight time can be shifted between aircraft types.
During austere periods expensive aircraft lose flying time
in favor of the cheaper to fly models. This freedom to
freely switch funds as needed enabled the MACOMS to fly out
the programs within budgetary limitations.
The major components of cost are considered to be fuel
and consumable supplies, depot level maintenance and
aircraft spare parts. For FY 1985 the projected costs of
fuel, consumables, and spare parts was $820.6 million.
25
The Army measures basic flying ability through flight
time minimums and task iteration. Pilots are rated on task
completion and evaluation in accordance with an Aviator
Readiness Level (ARL), the highest level being ARL-1
.
Pilots who receive only enough time to achieve ARL-1 are not
necessarily combat proficient. In order to maintain combat
proficient aviators the Army programs flying hours beyond
those demanded in the ARL system. N Mission training' is
conducted through combat scenarios with ground units. This
training is largely the responsibility of the low level
commander and is subject only to subjective assessment.
Combat proficiency is not quantifiable due to the absence of
a requirements based measurement system.
2. Department of the Navy
The Navy and Marine Corps estimate the required
flying time per month necessary to be mission ready for each
type, model, and series (TMS) of tactical aircraft in use.
Historically, the Navy has programmed at approximately 86%
of this estimated requirement and resourced the squadrons
accordingly
.
In the 1960's, Flying Hour Program requirements were
tied to the NAVFORSTAT readiness system. Mission areas
directly related to the warfare specialty of the aircraft
were called fundamental mission requirements and those not
directly related were designated supporting mission
26
requirements . The sum of these two categories was referred
to as full mission readiness .
As a consequence of the austere post-Vietnam budgets,
the funding for full mission readiness could not be
sustained. Navy planners decided that acceptable levels of
readiness could be maintained if funding for supporting
missions was dropped and flying hours were concentrated
exclusively in fundamental, or primary , mission areas,
called Primary Mission Readiness (PMR). In reality
standards were lowered and PMR became the measure of the
requirements
.
In the mid 1970's budget constraints again dictated
flying hour reductions. Although Navy and Marine Corps
requirements did not decrease, an internal constraint was
imposed which established 88 % of PMR as the CNO flying hour
goal. 88$ PMR is the Department of the Navy's peacetime
goal for the overall program, which includes FRS and Fleet
Support. In POM 86, the FY87 PMR was funded at 86$
(including 2$ simulators), however the PMR was raised to 87$
during the NAVCOMPT review. The TACAIR percentage is
slightly lower than the overall program, with the exception
of deployed squadrons which are funded at 115$. For FY87
the flying hour goal for TACAIR is 85$ of PMR for both the
Navy and the Marine Corps.
The Operations and Maintenance, Navy appropriation
provides the funds for the day-to-day operations of the
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strategic and general forces of the Navy. Marine Corps
aviation receives it's operating funds from the same
appropriation. For FY86 the total 0&M,N authorization was
$25,072.5 million. The total OP-20 Navy/Marine Flying Hour
Program is $3,237,287 million, and the Marine TACAIR portion
is $545,463 million - a little over 2% of the total 0&M,N
authorization. In FY87 Navy/Marine TACAIR/ASW accounts for
61% of the total flying hour dollars and H7% of the total
hours. Appendix A provides more extensive tables of figures
that pertain to the Flying Hour Program.
The Flying Hour Program is a Department of the Navy
(DON) program that is concerned with the planning and
management of the annual flying hours of the Naval and
Marine Air Forces. The administrative chain (Figure 2-1)
for the flying hours fund flow, budget submission and
program management is different than the 0&M,MC chain
(Figure 2-2) or the operational chain (Figure 2-3) of
command. The key difference to the operating squadrons is
that the responsibility centers are the Commanders, Naval
Air Forces, Atlantic or Pacific (CNAL/CNAP) for the blue
dollars and the Commanding Generals, Fleet Marine Forces,
Atlantic or Pacific for the green dollars. In the
operational chain, the FMF commander reports to CinCLant or
CinCPac.
The basis for arriving at the total annual flying
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FIGURE 2-1. Organization for funds flow and budget submission for the Operations
and Maintenance, Navy Appropriation
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FIGURE 2-3. Operational chain of comnand.
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aircraft. There are two budget lines called Operating
Target Functional Categories (OFC's) that provide the direct
support to flying hours. They are;
OFC-01 : Flight Operations; includes petroleum, oil and
lubricants (POL) and flight equipment.
OFC-50: Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) and Depot
Level Repairables (DLR,s).
There are other OFC's - indirect costs, such as ADP,
transportation of people and things, Fleet photo support,
Marine Air Traffic Control, aviation TAD, etc. - that figure
into the ultimate cost per hour but are not a part of the
FHP and will not be considered.
3 . Determining requirements
To determine the budget requirement two things must
be known, the cost per hour and the total number of hours
required. This is done through the compilation of
historical data and consolidated flying hour requirements
submitted from the operating forces.
OFC-01 /50 obligations and hours flown are reported
monthly by squadrons to their respective Marine Aircraft
Group (MAG) fiscal office. The MAG in turn submits the
reports, by message, simultaneously to the wing, FMF
headquarters, and responsibility centers (CNAP/CNAL). The
report is called the Budget OPTAR Report or BOR and is the
key financial management device in the Flying Hour Program.
The BOR reports obligations by fund code for the month.
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Commanders can use the BOR to balance obligations against
projected plans. CNAP/CNAL use the BOR's to:
(1) Evaluate its financial situation;
(2) Support subsequent fiscal year budget submissions;
(3) Measure squadron budget performance;
(4) Prepare several management control reports,
including the Flight Hour Cost Report and other
Flying Hour Program reports;
The BOR provides the following information:
(1) Obligations for aircraft operations and
maintenance
;
(2) Applicable aircraft type equipment code (TEC);
(3) Number of operating aircraft;
(4) Total gallons fuel consumed during the month;
(5) Flight hours flown during the month;
CNAL/CNAP compiles the data and submits the Flight
Hour Cost Report to CNO. The Flight Hour Cost Report is
used to prepare the yearly budget for dollars, hours, and
costs per hour. The net result is called the CNO Operations
Plan 20, or OP-20.
The computed CPH can vary within T/M/S because of types
of operations, operating procedures, or geographical
location. There have been budgeting problems during the
past several fiscal years because of CPH differences in high
performance aircraft. The Marine Corps tends to burn more
fuel per hour than the Navy because of differences in
operating procedures. At the NAVCOMPT, OSD, and
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Congressional level the CPH becomes an average for the T/M/S
and the differences may get lost. As a result a particular
Marine Corps T/M/S could end up being underfunded.
Readiness is the key factor in establishing the flying
hour requirements. The Marine Corps uses Combat Readiness
Percentage (CRP) as its standard. CRP is determined by the
degree of completion of a Training and Readiness Manual
syllabus. The T&R Manual is based on total mission
readiness. It standardizes aviation training and specifies
flight qualification performance requirements for aircrews
by type/model aircraft. The percentage of completion of the
prescribed syllabus is the basic standard by which the
Marine TACAIR Flying Hour requirement is stated. The CRP
range is from the minimum qualification of Combat Capable at
60$ to Fully Combat Capable at 100%. The FMFPAC goal is for
80% to 85% CRP.
The fleet squadrons will submit annual flying hour
ojections based on historical data, projected training,
and deployement requirements to their respective Marine
Aircraft Group (MAG). The projections are submitted for the
upcoming fiscal year and for several outyears to be used for
future planning. The MAG consolidates the squadron requests
and submits them to the wing, and wing to FMF headquarters.
Each FMF headquarters has a FHP manager assigned to oversee
the budget submission and execution of the FHP. Although he
works under the Force Comptroller he also has a
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responsibility to the G-3 or operations head for
coordinating fiscal and operational requirements. The force
headquarters then submits the total force requirements up
the chain as diagrammed in fig. 2-1. The Marine Corps
requirements are merged with the Navy requirements. They
are then considered in terms of Primary Mission Readiness,
which are those hours required to keep the average flight
crew qualified and current to perform the primary mission of
the assigned aircraft. This can lead to problems in
understanding the program as the Marine Corps plans in terms
of total mission readiness while the DON program is
expressed in terms of Primary Mission Readiness. The
difference is that CRP addresses a percentage of syllabus
completion „while PMR is the stated total requirement of the
hours to meet the planned aircrew training and operational
commitments. This relationship and problem of terminology
will be discussed more in Chapter IV.
Meanwhile the Navy/Marine Flying Hour Program Manager
(N0P-51C) at the CNO level is preparing the OP-20 report.
The OP-20 establishes controls on fleet planning. The OP-20
budgets flying hours at less than the fleet requirements.
For example the FY86 unrestrained requirement for Marine
TACAIR was 364,819 total TACAIR hours. The OP-20 set the
funding at 306,845 hours, or 84.11% of the requirement.
Until FY84 the Marine PMR had been consistently below 80%,
while the Navy's was over 85%. Since FY84 the Marine PMR
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has been steadily increased so as to achieve parity with the
Navy program in FY87. Figure 2-4 graphs the yearly
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Figure 2 -A. Comparison of Navy and Marine PMR, FY81-FY87
Appendix B outlines the OP-20 methodology and the
structure for flying hour inputs from the fleet.
1 . Budget submission
Once the OP-20 and fleet requests are consolidated the
total requirement is submitted to the Comptroller of the
Navy (NAVCOMPT) . A NAVCOMPT analyst reviews the requirements
to see if they are justifiable and defendable. The analyst
plays an important role in the budget submission as he is
probably the key individual in making sure that the programs
are understandable by OSD and Congress.
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The next level is the OSD analyst where there is less
sympathy and understanding of the programs. If a
requirement is not clearly and fully justified it is subject
to being quickly marked. This is where the Marine Corps
program often runs into difficulties. As there are
differences in the way the Navy and Marine Corps operate,
the requirements may be somewhat different. Since the FHP
is essentially a Navy program some of- the Marine Corps
requirements are not stated to reflect the total requirement
or are lost in the larger program. As a result some Marine
Corps programs are marked because of misunderstanding the
requirement and have to be won back through reclama. From
OSD the budget request becomes part of the President's
budget and is submitted to Congress. Congress has been
funding the FHP as requested, however, there have been
questions raised about certain portions of the program that
could affect the Marine Corps. That is why it is important
to have the requirements correctly stated and justified.
In FY83 the Marine Corps discovered some of the
problems of an understated program with the underpricing of
some aircraft operations. Figure 2-5 illustrates the affect
of correcting the budget requirements as the total TACAIR
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Figure 2-5. Marine Corps total annual TACAIR Flying Hours FY80-FY87
5 . Budget execution
Once the budget authorization and appropriations
are made by Congress the fund flow is back down through the
fiscal chain to the operators in the fleet. The upper level
movement and control of the funds is not important to this
study and will not be described. However, any withholds of
allocation by a higher command can affect the fleet's
execution of their program.
As shown in Figure 2-1 , the operating budget holder and
thereby the responsibility center is at the Commander, Naval
Air Forces level. CNAP/CNAL issue operating targets
(OPTARS) to the squadrons via the force, wing, and group
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commanders. This limits the FMF commanders flexibility in
executing their programs somewhat.
Although there may be some argument for bypassing
CNAP/CNAL in the funds flow, it is important that the Fleet
CinC's maintain control as they have operational control
over the FMF's and need to ensure the support is there for
Fleet directed operations.
The squadrons reduce their OPTAR's by making
obligations for goods and services in day-to-day operations.
The obligations are forwarded to the group fiscal office
which consolidate them and forward them to the Fleet
Accounting and Disbursing Center where they are matched with
claims and expenditures are made. The group submits the
BOR's showing actual costs and hours. The BOR is then used
by commanders to monitor program execution.
B. OBJECTIVES OF MARINE AVIATION
Early in the formulation stage of this thesis a
suggestion had been made to look at the feasibility of
making the Flying Hour Program part of the O&M.MC or green
dollar account. Because of the mission, operational chain
of command, and maintenance and supply structure of Marine
aviation, and the fact that the Navy owns all the aircraft
this alternative was discarded without any serious
consideration.
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The intent of this section is to provide background on
the mission of the Marinie Corps and Marine aviation so as
to provide a better understanding of the integral part that
Marine aviation plays in the Navy's mission. The primary
and collateral missions are spelled out as background to
what Primary Mission Readiness means.
1 • Mission of the Marine Corps
In part, from the Marine Corps Manual [Ref. 4;p. 1-
3] as it refers to the Fleet Marine forces:
Provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together
with supporting air components, for services with the
United States Fleet in seizure or defense of advanced
naval bases and for the conduct of such land operation as
may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
Provide, as required, Marine forces for airborne
operations, in coordination with the Army, the -Navy, and
the Air Force and in accordance with doctrines established
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The manual [Ref. 4;p. 3-3] goes on to describe the
responsibilities for operational readiness:
The Commandant of the Marine Corps is directly responsible
to the Secretary of the Navy for the operational readiness
of the entire Marine Corps.
The Commandant is also responsible to the Chief of
Naval Operations for the readiness and performance of
those forces of the Marine Corps assigned to the Operating
Forces of the Navy.
Commanders are responsible for maintaining their
commands in a state of readiness to perform their
assigned mission.
2
. Objectives of Marine Aviation
The legal status of Marine aviation is established
by the National Security Act of 1947. It directs;
40
The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall
be so organized as to include not less than three combat
divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat,
aviation, and other services as may be organic
therein.... [Ref. 5;p. 2]
FMFM 5-1 [Ref. 5;p. 5] describes the primary and
collateral missions of Marine Aviation as follows:
The primary mission of Marine Corps Aviation is to
participate as the supporting air component of Fleet
Marine Forces in the seizure and defense of advanced naval
•bases and to conduct such land operations as may be
essential for the prosecution of a naval campaign. A
collateral mission is to participate as an integral
component of naval aviation in the execution of such other
Navy functions as the fleet commanders so direct.
The current organization of Marine aviation units for
administration, operations, and training consists of wings,
groups, squadrons, and missile units. There are four Marine
Aircraft Wings, three assigned to the regular forces and one
reserve wing. The Marine aircraft wing is task organized by
various groups. Groups are composed of squadrons which
provide the aircraft, support equipment, and personnel to
perform assigned missions and tasks. The squadrons are the
organizational building blocks employed in organizing air
task-type commands.
The squadron, missile unit, and special task units are
the only units within Marine aviation formed on published
tables of organization (T/O's). A wing or group has no
inherent tactical mission capability except that provided by
its assigned T/0 units. During peacetime squadrons are
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manned at 90$ of the T/0. Group staff officers fly with the
squadrons and will augment them to 100$ during wartime.
The Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) is the smallest
aviation unit designed for relatively independent operations
with no outside assistance except access to a source of
supply. Each MAG is task organized for the mission assigned
and the facilities from which it will operate.
The Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) is also task organized
to accomplish the missions assigned. Each wing may be
different in organization - designed to provide a flexible
and balanced air combat organization capable of providing
air combat operations in a variety of areas without the
requirement of prepositional support, control, and logistic
facilities. The MAW is the smallest unit that can provide
all functions of Marine aviation. Those functions are;
- Offensive air support.
- Offensive anti air warfare.





At the present time there are approximately 900
aircraft in three wings and the 1st Marine Brigade that make
up the Tactical Air of the Fleet Marine Forces.
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C. HISTORY OF MARINE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM
Until the early 1980's there was no Marine Corps Flying
Hour Program. During the period FY 1978-1980, the Marines
were unable to execute the budgeted program for various
reasons as;
- Low retention of qualified/experienced aviators.
- Low output of new pilots from the Training Command.
- Shortages of high skill, experienced maintenance
personnel
.
- Shortages of spare parts - high cannibalization
rates
.
- Poor MC/FMC rates.
During FY's 1981-1982, the Marines made a concerted
effort to get the program back on track, eliminating most of
the deficiencies and improving in the rest.
Pilot retention improved and pilot training (undergraduate)
increased. The pilot population has increased over 30
percent since the low point in 1980. Figure 2-6 graphs the
trend from FY74 to FY84. In September, 1985 the Marine
Corps pilot requirement was 3986 Lieutenant Colonels and
below, and there was 4308, a plus 322, on hand. Appendix D
gives a detailed breakdown of the pilot status for FY83 and
a projected pilot inventory vs requirements through FY90.
The pilot growth and subsequent overpopulation in some
communities created a new problem.
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Figure 2-6. Pilot requirement vs inventory FY74-FY84
The OP-20 was understated as the crew seat ratio (CSR) was
lower than that needed to support pilots on hand and thereby
lowers the actual PMR below 100 percent for some aircraft.
For example in FMFPAC the A-6E, UH-1N, and FA-18 had more
crews than were reflected in the FY85/86 OP20 report of June
1984 [Ref. 6]. The following shows the OP-20 and actual
crew seat ratios for these aircraft.
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HQ T/M/S # A/C CSR CREWS
CNO OP-20 A-6E 20 1 .25 25.00
FMFPAC A-6E 20 1 .40 28.00
CNO OP-20 UH-1N 48 0.85 40.80
FMFPAC UH-1N 48 1 .02 49.00
CN0-0P20 FA-18A 36 1 .33 47.88
FMFPAC FA-18A 36 1 .58 57.00
As a result these aircraft end up being under-budgeted
for the pilots on hand and the lower flying hours per pilot
has a direct effect on aircrew readiness.
Significant improvements in the number and quality of
maintenance personnel combined with an improvement in
Mission Capable and Full Mission Capable rates of the
aircraft increased aircraft availability and therefore
improved the ability to execute the flying hour program.
Those rates have risen dramatically since 1981. LtGen Keith
A. Smith reported [Ref. 7] to Congress that in 1985 Marine
aviation established a new overall aggregate readiness
record of 75 percent mission capable. Figure 2-7
graphically depicts the rise in these rates over the past
five years. Mission capable status indicates the
availability of a combat aircraft to perform at least one of
the missions for which it was designed. Full mission
capable status indicates the availability of combat aircraft
to perform the full range of tactical missions for which it
was designed.
Another factor that has affected mission capable rates
is that new aircraft being introduced to the fleet not only
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Figure 2-7. Aircraft Readiness Rates.
and concerted effort to design systems that are reliable and
maintainable. For example, the F/A-18 averaged 85 percent
mission capable and 82 percent full mission capable for
1985. The AV-8B in 1985, its first year, maintained a 85
percent mission capable rate and a 79 percent full mission
capable rate [Ref. 7:p. 70].
As a result of the Marine Corps underflying the program
prior to FY83, the Chief of Naval Operations regularly
realigned funds budgeted for Marine squadrons to Navy
squadrons. The net result was that the Marine percentage of
PMR declined relative to the Navy PMR shown in Figure 2-4.
Inspite of improvement in aircraft readiness and the Marines
ability to execute the program funds were continued to be
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realigned into FY83 when the Marines could have been able to
fully execute the program.
At the same time it was discovered the costs per hour
were incorrect. This had not been a concern previously as
there was always more money than the Marines could execute.
The cost per flying hour discrepancy further hindered the
ability to execute the program. This came as a result of
increased emphasis of the balance between operational and
material readiness. Type Commanders had been realigning
large numbers of flying hours among various T/M/S and in
effect were outflying their support tail. The support tail
are basically the spare parts in the supply system required
to sustain a given tempo of flight operations so aircraft
are not grounded due to a spare part not being available.
The support tail is developed around projected operations
and a complex model used to develope a required spares
inventory. As an example suppose the F-4S was budgeted for
1000 hours but it was only flown 500 hours, and the AV-8B
was budgeted for 500 hours and flew 1000. The result would
be excess F-4 parts and a shortage of AV-8 parts.
In order to ensure the two programs remained balanced,
the Type Commanders were advised to limit flying hour
realignments to those required in support of operational
requirements. According to Barber [Ref. 8] this change
effectively eliminated "managing at the bottom line" and
forced management by T/M/S, and focused the attention on the
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cost per hour. The FY83 program was plagued by pricing
problems in both fuel consumption and maintenance costs.
The F-4 was being operated more at low altitudes and in
after-burner causing fuel consumption to increase, and this
increase was not being budgeted for. The fleet continued to
fly at this rate at the expense of other programs and
subsequently forced reductions in flying hours in order to
finance higher costs.
In FY82 it became apparent that some action on the part
of the Marine commanders that action must be taken.
FMFLANT, shortly followed by FMFPAC in FY83, developed a
Flying Hour Program. The office of the Flying Hour Program
Manager, or Aviation Financial Management Officer in FMFPAC,
was created and staffed with an aviator. The FHP Manager is
responsible to the Force Comptroller, however he works
closely with the G-3, Operations Office so as to tie fiscal
planning and operational requirements together.
With the efforts of these managers and analysts and
planners at the CNO level the pricing, parity and some other
problems were corrected by FY85. It became apparent that
there needed to be high level awareness and assistance at
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). As the program is funded
through the Navy chain there was little awareness of any
problems in the budget process or funds flow. There needed
to be some way for Headquarters Marine Corps to monitor the
program and step in with high level assistance if needed.
48
In May 1985 Major Jack Pettine from the Aviation Plans,
Programs, Doctrine, Joint Matters and Budget Branch was
appointed as a staff officer at HQMC dedicated the FHP. His
roll is to keep HQMC advised on the Flying Hour Program and
work with analysts at NAVCOMPT. The intent is not to
scrutinize or manage FMF programs or circumvent the chain of
command. If necessary, HQMC will intercede or assist on
issues of sufficient magnitude. In October Major Mike Snow
from the Fiscal Division was assigned as an advisor to work
the program and to keep the Fiscal Director advised.
All personnel involved in the Flying Hour Program now
meet annually for a Flying Hour Conference at HQMC just
prior to the Navy Flying Hour Conference to discuss problems
and coordinate their programs. The objectives of the
conference are to identify those issues the Marine Corps
program managers want presented at the CNO Flying Hour
conference, and to develope a united USMC position.
The Marine Corps Flying Hour Program is well
established and working towards a goal of maximum
effectiveness. The program was built through the efforts of
individuals like Jay Heffernan, Dick Crawford, Rick
Herrington, Dick Ward, Greg Barber, Carl Franklin, Mike




III. RESOURCE LIMITATIONS AND READINESS
As the budget deficit and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
legislation so dramatically point out, the resources
available for defense are limited and the Congressional mood
is not favorable to increases in defense spending. This
chapter looks at the general question of cost and
effectiveness in terms of resource limitations versus
defense capability, especially that pillar of defense
capability called readiness. What should the goal of the
Marine Corps Flying Hour Program be - to maximize
effectiveness for a given cost or to minimize cost for a
given effectiveness? For any changes in resource inputs
what will the effects on the returns of capability? Can the
effects be measured? These are current and vital questions
and will be examined in the light of up-to-date research.
A. COST, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY
The costs of a program are those inputs or resources
utilized towards attaining the stated objectives or goals of
that program. Effectiveness is the level or degree that
program uses those resources to achieve the intended or
expected effect. In this case it is how well the Marine
Corps Flying Hour Program meets or prepares for the
objectives stated in chapter 2. To be efficient is acting
or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense or
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unnecessary effort. In general terms efficiency is simply
the making good use of resources.
Figure 3-1 provides an illustration of the relationship
between program costs and its effectiveness. The figure
assumes that for any given input on either axis there is a
given output for that particular program. Both the proposed
expenditure and the effectiveness should not be specified at
the same time; this over specifies the criterion and can
result in asking for alternatives that are either
unobtainable (point A) or underdesigned (point B) . The cost
increments are increased by equal amounts along the cost
axis. If the cost was fixed at C1 the output would be E1 .
By increasing the cost to C2 the output would increase to
E2. Increasing to C3 through C5 the increase in
effectiveness returns increase at a diminishing rate as the





curve flattens out. In this area of diminishing returns it
becomes senseless to continue to increase the level of
input. The optimal point is to maximize the ratio of
effectiveness to cost. The best effectiveness-cost ratio is
the slope of a line drawn from the origin to a tangent point
on the curve. At that point of tangency, or knee of the
curve, the program is returning the best effectiveness to
cost. This approach of setting maximum- cost so that it
corresponds to the knee of the curve cost-effectiveness is
useful and prevalent.
Figure 3-1 is not a model of the cost-effectiveness
curve of the Marine Corps Flying hour Program, it is just
for illustrative purposes. However some relationships can
be made. Cost would be 0&M,N dollars allocated or it could
be flying hours planned. Effectiveness could be primary
mission readiness, the criterion used to establish the level
of funding for the Flight Hour Program. Figure 3-2
illustrates the relationship between flying hours - the
input cost and Primary Mission Readiness - the measured
output of effectiveness. The graph uses FY84 TACAIR data
and is not to scale as the program might actually be but it
can be used to illustrate a couple of points.
First, the best cost-effectiveness ratio is at
approximately 60% of Primary Mission Readiness while the
executed program of 285,309 hours for Marine TACAIR produced
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Mission Readiness.
program would never be budgeted at 60% as that would be an
unacceptable level of readiness. As discussed previously
85% is the current and acceptable goal.
Second, why not try and achieve 1 00% readiness? As can
be seen by the curve 100% would increase the costs
dramatically. There are a number of factors that make the
100% goal nearly impossible to achieve at any cost.
Continual turnover of pilots coming from and going to non-
flying jobs, new pilots coming out of training squadrons,
the highly degradable nature of currency qualifications,
situations where certain types of sorties cannot be flown,
all restrict the entire TACAIR force from achieving and
sustaining 100% PMR.
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B. MEASUREMENTS OF READINESS
Congress asks questions about current state of military
capability and what DoD is getting from the funds being
spent for national defense. It is a difficult concept to
quantify and measure. The U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) concluded in a recent report that there is no
quantitative measure that describes the general warfighting
capability of our forces, and DoD doubts that a meaningful
single measure can be developed [Ref. 2:p. 2].
The Department of Defense defines military capability
as
v
the ability of the force to achieve a wartime objective
(win a battle or a war or destroy a target )'[ Ref . 2:p. 1],
Military capability is made up of several "pillars' as
diagrammed in Figure 3-3-
Figure 3-3- Pillars of military capability and readiness.
MILITARY CAPABILITY








Sustainability - staying power of our forces during combat
operations. Represents our ability to resupply engaged
forces with replacement manpower, equipment, and other
supplies
.
Modernization - qualitative, technical capabilities of our
weapons systems and equipment.
Readiness - collective ability of the force to deliver the
outputs for which they were designed, to include the ability
to deploy and employ without unacceptable delay.
Essentially a pre-D-Day measure of the personnel and
material health of our force relative to wartime
requirements
.
Force structure - numbers, size and composition of the
units that comprise our defense forces.
The chief area of concern of this study is that of
readiness. As can be seen in Figure 3-3 readiness is broken
down further into four more areas. Congress would like to
know more about readiness and the affects of the budget on
readiness, especially what affects changes in funding have.
Although a unit's readiness is heavily influenced by the
amount, type, and quality of training it receives, the
services cannot determine precisely how readiness is
affected by changes in the level of training activity, with
training being the key element of the Flying Hour Program.
No one unit training program, evaluation, or inspection
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gives a commander solid evidence that his unit is trained at
any specific level of readiness. However, the services
individually and collectively evaluate how well units can
perform wartime missions. From these evaluations come a
myriad of quantitative and subjective indications which
highlight unit strengths and weaknesses. Although there is
no single indicator of readiness, more indicators pertain to
readiness than any other pillar of military capability.
There is a problem with linking these internal reports with
outside interests. DoD managers may not be completely frank
in assessing readiness, sustainabil i ty , or capability if
they know assessments will be used outside DoD.
Program goals and objectives for operational units are
typically expressed in terms of resources consumed or
required, such as hours flown. However, they are not
designed to identify the effect of increasing or decreasing
funding levels.
There are several reports that address readiness from
the Congressional level down to those reports that
specifically report on Marine Corps aviation readiness.
1. Force Readiness Report
An annual report to Congress in support of the
President's budget. It is intended to give Congress a
description of the current readiness of the force and an
overall assessment of the readiness expected to result
from passage and execution of the defense budget. It
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is probably DoD's most comprehensive compilation of
readiness indicators. According to a recent GAO report
[Ref. 3:p. 21] the FRR does not fully identify the
readiness that will be achieved with the budget the
Congress is considering. Although it provides details
about training activities, such as flight hours, it does
not quantify the extent to which training affects
readiness. It has limited utility in budget analysis
because it does not address how readiness will be affected
if Congress chooses not to authorize and appropriate funds
at levels requested by DoD. The weaknesses of the FRR and
its relationship to the Flying Hour Program will be dealt
with more extensively in Chapters 4 and 5.
2. Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP)
The primary system for reporting unit level
readiness within DoD. An internal DoD management tool
used by the JCS to monitor status of military units.
Units report in terms of combat readiness ratings C-1 to
C-5 designed to measure the unit's ability to perform
its wartime tasks by assessing the peacetime availability
and status of resources possessed or controlled by the
unit in the four resource areas of personnel, equipment
and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and
training. The C-ratings are;
C-1 fully combat ready
C-2 substantially combat ready
C-3 marginally combat ready
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C-4 not combat ready
C-5 service programmed not combat ready
JCS uses the UNITREP as an input source for the JCS
Capability Report and the annual JCS Posture Statement to
Congress, as a medium for readiness briefings within DoD,
and as an indicator of problems and potential need to




A high level Navy report that reports the operating
tempo of the fleets. It is a fairly simple reporting
program execution and cost by numbered fleet. Flying
hours and dollar cost are reported for air and steaming
days and dollar costs for ships. Marine aviation is
included in the report. There are four basic
catagories on the report; training, major exercises,
contingency operations (will be funded by supplementary
appropriations if necessary, as with the Grenada
operation), and operations and service support. This
report gives a better breakdown of the type of operations
the money is used for. In this report Marine execution is
not differentiated from the Navy's and can cause some
problems because it does not highlight differences in the
way the services may operate.
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4. Marine Corps Reports
There are a number of reports, evaluations,
standards and systems that reflect the effectiveness
of the Marine Corps Flight Hour Program. They are
listed in Appendix C. These indicators are basically
internal for use by commanders at all levels. 'Some of
the data such as Combat Readiness Percentage (CRP),
hours and sorties flown, Mission Capable (MC) rates,
safety records, accident free hours, performance in
wartime, and C-Ratings are utilized by the high level
command structure, analysts and above.
C. THE CRITERION
To conduct a good cost vs effectiveness analysis there
must be a well established criterion to measure the
significance of the consequences of changes to the inputs.
The example of Figure 3-2 used Primary Mission Readiness
percentage as it is the basic criterion used by Congress,
DoD, and CNO for funding the FHP. However PMR, or Combat
Readiness Percentage (CRP) as it is referred to in the
Marine Corps is merely a measurement of training syllabus
completion and is only one indicator of the actual combat
capability of a unit. For example, participating in an
exercise may utilize a large number of hours and gain
aircrews invaluable experience but only achieve a small
increase in CRP. A pilot may complete a syllabus
requirement in one sortie but he may not be truly
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comfortable in performing that particular skill until he has
done it a number of times, and that repetition may not
increase his CRP. In reality he has achieved a higher state
of readiness but there has been no change in a quantifiable
indicator
.
CRP or PMR percentages may be misleading if used alone.
This was pointed out by the GAO reports. A change in flying
hour funding may not affect the readiness percentage by a
predetermined or predictable amount. One factor is the
non-training support and administrative sorties a unit
flies. These hours are paid for from the same funds yet do
not change readiness percentages. As an example, suppose
funding was reduced and aviation units were directed to
maintain tha. same level of readiness. This could be done be
reducing support type missions by turning down requests for
air support in training exercises of ground or other
aviation units. Those units that do not get the air support
now have lost their training and the aircrews that would
have flown the sorties have lost some valuable experience.
The final result is that the quantifiable readiness
indicators have remained the same at reduced cost, but the
overall readiness posture of the Marine Corps has lost.
Similarly, if funding were increased there may not be
an equivalent increase in CRP/PMR. As explained previously
the higher percentages would take more to achieve and
maintain—it would cost far more to increase one percent
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overall at the 90% level than it would at the 15% level. A
squadron that has been given additional hours may waste
hours on nonessential flights and accept missions that have
no particular training value to anyone concerned and would
have previously been turned down.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Because of a lack of a good criterion there is no way
of accurately knowing the effectiveness of cost changes in
the Flying Hour Program. Program managers and commanders
will certainly know the affects, however the problem is in
communicating that to the analysts at the Secretary of
Defense level and Congress. The Marine Corps TACAIR funding
comprises less than two percent of the O&M.N appropriation
alone. When considering the overall defense budget that OSD
and Congress must be concerned with, the Marine Corps Flying
Hour Program is a small concern so the program requirements
must be stated correctly and precisely.
The Marine Corps can improve the efficiency of the
program from within and can make it more effective without
necessarily relying on funding increases. That is not to
say that funding increasees are impossible. There must be a
concentrated effort to get the requirements correctly stated
in Marine Corps terms. Time is an important factor. The




This chapter deals with the problems of the Flying Hour
Program. Chapter V will examine alternatives to the
problems. The problems are discussed as three major areas.
The first and most critical area is how the requirements are
stated or defined. In general, this affects both the Navy
and Marine Corps, however there are several Marine Corps
specific problems that are factors in the modeling of
requirement determination that will be discussed. Stating
the requirement incudes such areas as PMR, cost per hour,
crew seat ratios, pilot population, staff hours, simulators,
Navy-Marine differences, and measurements.
The second area looks at program management. Here the
the chain of command, unit deployment, training of
accounting personnel, and communication between operators
and managers are discussed.
The third area is concerned with the understanding of
the program by all of those who are involved in it.
A. STATING THE REQUIREMENT
With the evolution of the Flying Hour Program and the
growth of the cost of flying hours a number of questions
have been raised within the Navy and Marine Corps concerning
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an adequate measurement of flying hour requirements.
Similar concerns have been raised by both OSD and Congress.
Marine managers feel that their requirements are underfunded
because they are not stated correctly and are understated.
Throughout all levels of the program it is easily
misunderstood. This section deals with those items that
have been factors in the problem of program understanding.
1 . PMR
The basis for programming of flying hours has, for
several years, been defined by primary mission readiness
(PMR). PMR may well be the least understood acronym in both
Congress and the defense establishment. Many knowledgable
people consider PMR to be a direct measure of operational
readiness since the term "readiness" is a part of it. There
Is no_correlation between PMR and the C ratings of the
UNITREP system. PMR is not a measure of operational
readiness. PMR is simply a statement of the flight hours
required per crew per month to conduct training in a
specific aircraft flight syllabus, and does not vary with
changes in the operating environment, operating tempo
(OPTEMPO) or crew qualification. The definition of PMR is
limited to aircrew training and does not recognize the
flight time requirements associated with fleet tasks and
commitments. There are some managers who will use the term
primary mission requirements [Ref. 9] as a statement of how
they see the program.
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Congress has been told that a given level of dollars
will achieve a given level of primary mission readiness.
The problem is, what does that really mean? The indicator
of accomplishment used by the Marine Corps is the percentage
of completion of the T&R Manual or CRP which is no more than
training accomplishment. The Navy equivalent is the
"Liberty Elite" program which is similar to the T&R Manual.
In essence they are expecting a quantifiable level of
readiness, but are getting a level of training.
Looking at the program in this light if the program is
funded at 88$ the reasonable assumption is that the return
will be 88% CRP or Liberty Elite completion. However, fleet
operations comprise a large part of the FHP. PMR does not
acknowledge fleet operations so both fleet operations and
support are conducted at the expense of primary mission
training. Fleet operations would include exercises, special
tasking, integrated operations, and surveillance missions.
Service support would include adminstrat ive and service
flights and maintenance check flights. Figure 4-1 depicts
the flying hour requirements as fixed and variable costs.
The fixed costs are the aircrew training goals and the
variable are the non-training hours. If there is a fenced
ceiling it could affect aircrew training, and readiness as
seen by the decision makers is degraded. Planners take the





Figure 4-1. Breakdown of flying hours.
budget requests, but they are beating the system by doing
this
.
PMR is very structured and does not allow for changes
in operating tempo. The Navy flying hours fluctuate between
deployed and non deployed status. While deployed, a
squadron will operate at high levels, usually well in excess
of the funded PMR rate. However, when the squadron returns
it will stand down and the tempo will go below the PMR rate
and the hours will average out. Readiness will degrade, but
that has been planned for. The Marine Corps does not
operate this way. The squadrons are required to maintain
readiness year around so there is no real stand down and
they simply resume normal day to day operations. When they
deploy the operations increase and PMR does not account for
those extra hours.
A system is needed that will be sensitive to operating
tempo - to deployment schedules, unit detachments, known
exercises - to establish realistic requirements by T/M/S.
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With a budget ceiling and an expected rate of return
there has been a tendency to inflate the low cost hours to
get PMR and stay in budget. This can be done two ways. One
way is to decrease the hours of the high burner type
aircraft, such as F-4's, A-6's, and F/A-18's, and pump up
hours of low cost aircraft such as helicopters and OV-10's.
As an illustration of the effect of low cost aircraft, about
655& of FMFPAC's aircraft cost under $1500 per hour to
operate while only 52% of FMFLANT's are below $1500. 'Table
B of Appendix A shows that the FY87 CPH for FMFPAC is $281
less than FMFLANT's.
Another way would be to restrict operations so the the
cost per hour is lower. There are several ways this can be
done; fly at optimum mission profiles, limit use of after
burner, use simulators more, etc., however, some training
and readiness would suffer.
2
. Cost Per Hour
Although the problems that existed with the cost
per hour in 1983 have been overcome CPH still continues as a
potential problem for the program. It is now generally
recognized that differences in operating procedures affects
fuel consumption and the resultant cost per hour. If a
change in CPH is not fully substantiated when an increased
request is made the difference may be lost in budget
analysis. The projected FY87 rates for the F/A-18 were
increased from an actual usuage figure of 24.2 barrels per
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hour to 26.0 barrels per hour. This change was based on the
Marine rates as they were using the aircraft more
aggressively and burning more fuel. However OSD marked the
increase as the increased fuel consumption was not
adequately substantiated.
If the operating units make a change in tactics that
require higher power settings or operations under conditions
that consume fuel at a higher rate than previously and these
changes are not communicated to the planners and program
managers the costs are not adjusted and the OP-20 is not
updated. As a result the operators are upset when their
programs are not funded adequately in the next budget cycle.
As an example 204,000 hours might be budgeted for in FMFPAC,
but because of differences between 0P-20 and actual CPH they
may be able to only fly 201,000 hours for the funded
dollars
.
3 . Crew Seat Ratio and Pilot Population
The Crew Seat Ratio (CSR) is one of the factors of
the 0P-20 model. It comes from a computer model called the
TAC Fliers Model developed by the Air Force. It considers
such things as sortie rate in wartime and many other
elements such as crew rest, leave, maximum hours that can be
flown by a pilot in a day. From the computation of all the
inputs the result is the maximum sustainable sortie rate of
the aircraft and the number of crews that it would take to
support this rate. The ratio is the number of aircrews per
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aircraft. If the CSR was 1.3 pilots per T/M/S and there
were 20 aircraft in the squadron then it would take 26
pilots. Manpower at HQMC developes the T/0 for that
squadron based on the force structure and CSR. During
peacetime, squadrons are normally manned at 90$ of the T/0.
Marine operators feel the ratios are too low throughout
the community and should be revalidated. It becomes a
question as to whether the ratios are too low or the pilot
population is too high. As explained previously there is an
overage of pilots in many of the squadrons. If the
requirement was based on 26 pilots at 25 hours per month the
requirement would be 650 hours per month. If there were
really 30 pilots in the squadron the budgeted time per pilot
would be reduced to 21.7 hours per month.
Some of the problem lies in the understanding of what
the crew seat ratios are. Some feel they are simply the
number of aircraft divided into the available number of
pilots. There is also a belief that there are seprate CSR's
for peacetime and war.
4. Staff Hours
Staff pilots are those pilots assigned to a wing
or group billet in a status of "Duty in a flying status
involving operational or training flights" [Ref. 10:p. 10-2]
or DIFOPS. The principle is that the staff pilots can
achieve and sustain a level of training and currency and
will be the principal and immediate source of combat
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augmentation for combat losses in a wartime situation.
Additionally, staff pilots are an excellent source of highly
qualified and experienced pilots and can augment the regular
training pilots. At the beginning of FY86 FMFLANT had a
requirement for 81 staff pilots and FMFLANT had a
requirement for 1 6 1 staff pilots [Ref. 11].
All pilots in a DIFOPS status are required by NATOPS
(Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization) instruction [Ref. 10] are required to fly
an annual minimum of 100 hours. The total staff hour
requirement is programmed into the OP-20 computation (see
Appendix A) prior to the CNO constraint. What is ended up
being funded is 8555 (using FY87 PMR percentage for TACAIR)
of the requirement, or 85 annual hours. However because
NATOPS still requires those pilots to fly 100 hours, the
deficient hours must be flown at the expense of the
squadrons PMR hours.
Recognizing this problem the Marine Corps addressed the
issue in the POM 87 request and substantially increased the
staff hours over FY85 levels. In just five T/M/S (A-4M, UH-
1N, CH-46E, KC-130, and AH-1 ) aircraft the total change was
from 5,948 actual hours in FY85 to 13,724 hours in FY87 - a
difference of 7,776 hours [Ref. 12]. NAVC0MPT felt it
wasn't justified and 0SD simply didn't believe the big
change. As a result the FY87 propsosal was marked back to
the FY85 level.
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The problem may get more critical in the future for the
following reasons;
As tactics and equipment become more complex there will
be a need for staff pilots to get more quality time in
squadron aircraft if they are to be a viable combat
augment
.
There will be a requirement to be as good as squadron
pilots .
Flying may become tactical or nothing at all - pure
proficiency flying may disappear.
Staff flying hours must be funded at the full requirement
and the Marine Corps must find a way to communicate this
requirement to the decision makers.
5 . Simulators
In a report [Ref. 13] conducted because of the fuel
shortage crises of 1973, the Government Accounting Office
recognized that significant savings could be realized
through the increased use of cockpit flight simulators in
place of flight time. The report recommended that the Navy
and Air Force use simulators as much as possible to maintain
desired proficiency.
The original goal was to replace 25% . of the flight
hours with simulator time by 1981. This was soon realized
by the Navy as being unrealistic and was reduced to k% , and
eventually reduced again to the present goal of 2% of PMR.
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According to Franklin [Ref. I4:p. 6] the current Navy-
policy on flight hour substitution is that flight simulation
utilization is a basic building block in the total training
program. It is not the Navy's intent to use simulators to
replace the aircraft in training, but rather to augment and
enhance training in the aircraft to the maximum effective
extent. The Marine Corps agrees with the basic policy that
flight simulators are necessary to augment and enhance
flight training but not at the expense of a reduced flying
hour program.
Franklin [Ref. 1 4 : p . 45] went on to reveal that the
Marine Corps flight simulator program was inconsistent from
year to year and between aircraft communities. He went on
to recommend that a logical and systematic approach to
deriving simulator hours could be implemented.
The Marine Corps, however has continued to resist the
full implementation of flight simulators. Table D of
Appendix A shows that simulator usuage by the Marine Corps
from FY81 through FY87 never rises above }%. In the POM87
PBD the Marine Corps' FHP was marked $5.9M because of the
large difference between Navy and Marine usuage. The OSD
analyst felt that the Marine Corps should be using flight
simulators more.
The problem is that in the early 80's the aircraft the
Marine Corps had were relatively simple aircraft and there
were few simulators in use. As more complex aircraft
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(CH-53E, F/A-18 and AV-8B) were introduced the simulator
program did not keep pace. Simulators have not been updated
with the aircraft and are not available when the squadrons
deploy.
Although Congress and OSD keep asking . for more
simulator usuage and look for the cost savings the operating
community has found that they can only do so much and cannot
replace actual experience. With flying hours limited the
the experience value of actual flying time is very high.
Although there may be a dollar cost saving when one hour of
flight time is replaced with one hour in the flight
simulator there is an opportunity cost of experience that
cannot be measured.
6
. Navy - Marine Corps Differences
There are some differences in the way the Navy and
Marines operate and those differences can create different
requirements
.
The Navy squadrons work in cycles around deployment
schedules. While deployed they will operate well above the
PMR rate, however when they return to a shore base they will
stand down and operate at a reduced rate. Overall flying
hours average out at the PMR rate. The Marines have a
requirement to maintain readiness year around. On
deployment they operate at the increased rate and upon
returning they do not stand down so they will operate at a
higher overall rate, requiring more hours overall.
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There are differences in T/M/S operating procedures
that can affect costs. The F-4 and F/A-18 are two aircraft
that serve as examples. The Marines operate at higher power
settings and in after burner more often. As a result more
fuel is consumed and the cost per hour is higher. This was
a real problem in FY83 when the Marine Corps lost a
substantial number of hours due to differences in cost per
hour of the F-4. The same problem arose for FY87 with the
F/A-18 when the POM was submitted. Because the Marines
flies the aircraft more aggresively the CPH for FY84 was too
low and was increased substantially for FY87. The PBD
reduced the funds back to FY84 levels as there was a lack of
substantiation for the increase.
The problem is that the Marine Corps program gets lost
into the overall DON program. As can be seen by Table B of
Appendix A, the Marine TACAIR program is less than 20% of
the overall DON flying hour program. Analysts and decision
makers are inclined to assume that some of the problems that
exist with the Navy will also exist with the Marine Corps.
When the 0&M,N budget was marked it was done with a broad
brush based on what the Navy is doing.
Less steaming days were scheduled for the ships and
therefore the assumption that less hours for fleet support
would be needed so a certain amount of money was cut,




The Navy has a shortage of aircrews so the budget was
marked by an appropriate amount. The Marine Corps was
marked similarly eventhough there is a surplus of aircrews.
Manpower is a Marine Corps budget item and was not seen by
the same analyst so there was no way for the 0&M,N analyst
to be aware of the real situation.
There is a problem as to who will make the reclamas to
the marks. As it is a DON budget request it may be
difficult for both the Navy and Marine Corps to make
seperate reclamas, so the Navy may represent both. The
danger is that the Marine problems may not get the same
amount of time as the Navy's.
The Navy's OPTEMPO report shows flying hours executed
by numbered fleet. Marine TACAIR flying hours are reported
as part of the Navy's. The report is Navy generated based on
Navy needs and it does not reflect a true picture of Marine
operations. Shore based deployments/exercises do not show
up as such but are reported as training. It appears the
Marines do all the training while the Navy does all the
operating. This makes the Marines vulnerable to cuts to
beef up Navy training.
7 . Training
TACAIR loses hours to training. The Department of
the navy has mandated that the Fleet Readiness Squadrons
(FRS) be funded at 100%. These are the units that provide
transition and refresher training to aircrews. The planned
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hours are underfunded because the budget does not show what
it really costs. The hours that are budgeted for are the
student's hours but there are a lot of fixed cost, or





- Section leaders on formation flights
- Ferry flights
- Any non-syllabus flight
- Instructor under training (IUT)
- Administrative flights
For every 100 hours there are roughly 25 hours of
overhead, so the requirement should be 125 hours. However
the funding is based on the syllabus hours. The real
training load should be identified. The numbers may end up
being manipulated to meet requirements. The result is that
less training is ultimately accomplished or the money comes
out of TACAIR.
8. USMC Policy
At the present there is no real USMC policy or
flying hour program. The programs in the FMF's were
developed unilaterally by each Force - FMFLANT in 1982 and
FMFPAC in 1983. The Marine Corps is developing a flying
hour program as evidenced by the assignment of staff
officers at HQMC as program coordinators and the annual
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Flying Hour Conference. The lack of a unified position,




This section is about the flying hour program
management from the budgeting policies at the Department of
Defense and Congressional level down to the squadron
commander. In particular the areas to be discussed are;
* Budgeting priorities.
* Problems associated with being a part of the Navy
fiscal system.
* Unit deployment crossfunding.
* Communications betweens operations and fiscal.
* Training of group accounting personnel.
1 . Budgeting Priorities
In a study by Horowitz [Ref. 15] in 1982, he
inferred that the United States spends too much to buy new
hardware, and not enough to man and support it adequately.
He felt that part of the reason may be that the political
process and the timing of expenditures conspire to make
hardware easier to sell and support easier to cut. Perhaps
this is due in part to the inability of the sponsors of
support to justify their requests in terms that appeal to
the decision makers.
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Procurement gets the glamor and the vendor support.
Relatively few contractors are affected by O&M and manpower
budgets which are the principal appropriations that keep
aircraft flying and ships at sea. Steaming and flight hours
often take a low priority when put up against procurement
projects and do not always get the support they need. This
can be evidenced by some of the 0&M,N marks being made




As was shown in Figure 2-1 the funds flow of the OP-20
is through the two major claimants, CINCPACFLT and
CINCLANTFLT. The operating budgets (OPBUD's) are held by
the air type commanders, COMNAVAIRPAC and COMNAVAIRLANT
.
The FMF commander is best described as a conduit of funds
for FMF aviation. The FMF commander is not even an OPTAR
holder for OFC 01 (fuel) or OFC 50 (50) funds.
The FMF commander performs many of the tasks of the
OPBUD holder, but is at the mercy of the air type commander.








The expertise on the 0&M,N funded FMF aviation rests at
the force comptroller level - not at CNAP/CNAL, HQMC, or at
CNO. The FMF commander currently develops its OP-20 within
hour/dollar controls established by the OPBUD holder.
However, the current situation gives the FMF commander
little flexibility or independence in controlling the
program. Some degree of flexibility may be given by the
OPBUD holder depending on the individual. In short, he does
all the work without the reward of running his own show.
The force commander should have the flexibility to move
dollars between programs. There are many occasions during a
year when there are good reasons to move funds from one
T/M/S to another. One community may be having maintenance
problems and cannot fly the hours funded and another may
have participated in a couple of exercises that burned up
more hours than planned and is facing a shortfall. The
commander should be able to act quickly and not have to
exercise a message drill with justifications to get the
approval
.
Other problems that exist by being in the Navy system
were explained in the previous section.
3 . Unit Deployment Crossfunding
Squadrons regularly deploy from one fleet command
to another. For example the Second Marine Air Wing usually
has two squadrons deployed to WestPac at any given time.
The squadrons are under operational control of the First
78
Marine Air Wing and under administrative control of the 2nd
MAW. The OFC 01 funds goes with the squadrons and the OFC
50 funds are transferred to COMNAVAlRPAC . The OFC 01 is
based on at what level that unit is funded and the 0P-20
CPH. The OFC 50 is based on a Lant/Pac average of CPH for
maintenance
.
In WestPac the CPH is normally higher so the squadron
cannot fly the hours budgeted. The squadron is now
dependant on COMNAVAIRLANT to approve additional funds or
fly less. If funding is tight then the squadron loses some
valuable flying time.
A similar situation occurs when a squadron is deployed
aboard ship under a different fleet commander. The deployed
squadron is funded based on projected flying hours for that
deployment. If the Carrier Air Group (CAG) commander flies
the squadron past the budgeted hours he can ask for more
funds from the claimant. As an example two F/A-18 squadrons
from FMFPAC deployed aboard the Coral Sea under CAG 1 3 and
COMNAVAIRLANT. CAG flew the squadrons in excess of the
planned hours and requested more money from COMNAVAlRPAC.
FMFPAC ended up having to reprogram from another OFC to
support the requirement. FMFPAC had to get permission from
COMNAVAlRPAC as they do not have the authority to do it on
their own.
FMFPAC has no control over how the assigned funds of a
shipboard squadron can be spent. It is up to the CAG's to
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decide and Navy squadrons could be tasked to fly more using
funds funded for Marine squadrons. FMFLANT does not have




Operators from the wing staff may lose sight of the
fiscal impacts of things they may do or of which they have
knowledge of. A new tactic could be instituted that burns
more fuel and affects the cost per hour. If the operators
don't communicate that change to the fiscal managers they
will not be able to adjust the requirement, and the funding
will remain at the old level.
New aircraft may be delivered to a squadron early or
late, and that will impact on the total hours a squadron may
fly. That information must be passed to the comptroller so
he can plan for the changes. If the squadron underflies a
goal and there is a surplus it could be distributed to other
squadrons. If there is to be a shortfall the comptroller
can try to find or ask for more funds if he knows about it.
5 . Group Accounting
Obligations for fuel and maintenance are done by
the squadrons with credit cards, requistions or other
documents, and open accounts. The obligations are submitted
to the group fiscal office where they are consolidated and
forwarded to the Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center
( FAADPAC/LANT)
. FAAD receives the requisitions/charges and
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makes all disbursements and expenditures. They compare the
obligations and expenditures and draw up a difference
listing which shows when obligations and expenditures don't
match. Because of the paperwork they are 3-6 months behind
which causes a problem at the end of the fiscal year. The
group tries to do the accounting on their own so they will
have some idea of where they stand and can anticipate any
problems.
There are no civilians in a Marine Aircraft Group and
the turnover of Marines is high so trying to maintain a
level of expertise and consistency is an ongoing problem,
especially in a fiscal office where the Marines assigned are
aviation supply MOS ' s and have no accounting background.
As a result the fiscal office must have an ongoing training
program. This lack of training causes time away from the
job to train and causes inconsistencies between MAG's in the
way they conduct business.
Even if 3^15/3^51 accounting personnel were assigned
they do not have any blue dollar training or experience and
must be trained for the 0&M,N accounting.
6
. Program Manipulation
One of the reasons the flying hour program is
difficult to measure in meaningful and quantifiable terms is
its susceptibility to manipulation at the operator level.
The same returns can be gained from an over or under funded
program. If underfunded, cost savings measures may be
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imposed so as to use less fuel and get more flight time for
the dollar. Some of these measures include;
Limit flights to those that do not use as much fuel.
High altitude flights, instruments, low burner
operations. "Boring holes" - may not provide
meaningful training.
Reprogram hours into lower CPH aircraft such as
helicopters or prop driven.
Schedule more simulator time.
Use ranges closer to home.
Limit wasteful flights.
It is a question of balance between operational and
fiscal responsibility. Fiscal constraints become overriding
and detract from the quality of training. Today's threat
requires tactics that may consume high rates of fuel. If
tactics cannot be practiced sufficiently in peacetime there
may be an affect on combat performance with possible higher
casualty rates realized if aircrews are not comfortable with
procedures
.
If overbudgeted, the money may be spent to buy
extra tools and parts to "get well" or stock up for less
affluent times. Fuel conservation will not be practiced,
flying at high power settings, extending flights, or flying
sorties unnecessarily.
The measurement system can be manipulated so it will
appear more favorable. FMC/MC status of aircraft is one of
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the more widely used indicators of readiness and one of the
easiest areas to manipulate. A squadron can make figures
say what they want them to while leaving no visible trail to
be audited.
Hours don't necessarily equate to readiness. By adding
range tanks or throttling back to maximum endurance
settings, a squadron can add hours and reduce sorties. As
an example a fighter squadron can add three range tanks and
fly at max endurance and expand a 1.2 hour sortie into 2.5
hours. However the aircraft are not best utilized at max
endurance and for those missions pilots are cheating the
system and not getting the training benefit from them.
Other readiness indicators are easily manipulated as
the evaluations are subjective^. Forecasted operations plans
can be made to look good by underestimating sorties to be
flown, then adding on sorties during the day. A squadron
can get 150-200? of monthly operation plan completion this
way.
C. PROGRAM UNDERSTANDING
The flying hour program is complex and difficult to
understand. The confusion over PMR has been explained.
What the planners in the fleet are expecting to accomplish
with the funds and what is expected of them by Congress may
be two entirely different things. This can cause problems
in funding and future support.
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High level Navy personnel may not understand the Marine
requirements and not give them the proper support in the
budget evolution.
Operators at the group and squadron may not understand
the fiscal consequences of their actions. They see. hours
and the need to fly. When the hours are not budgeted they
may not see why or understand the results of flying at
higher power settings and using fuel at a faster rate.
The poorer the understanding is of the program the
harder it is to sell the requirements of the program and the
harder it is to control its execution.
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V. ALTERNATIVES
This section presents alternatives to issues raised in
section IV. The implementation of the alternatives will not
be presented. The alternatives are presented as general
suggestions and not delved into with a lot of detail. Many
of the alternatives have been under study or are being
implemented. As an example POM-88 will present total
mission requirements (TMR) as a replacement for PMR.
A. STATING THE REQUIREMENT
1 . Primary Mission Readiness
There needs to be a better definition of the FHP
requirements. It needs to categorize the other demands on
flight time that do not contribute directly to readiness
training and is sensitive to OPTEMPO - it needs to be
adjustable for the variable costs shown in Figure 4-1.
The system receiving wide support to replace the
present one is Total Mission Requirements or TMR. TMR is
developed from service support (tasks and commitments),
battle ops (operations and exercises), and aircrew training.
TMR would then cover;
These hours would maintain flight crew qualifications
in warfare specialty areas.
Provide necessary fleet operations support.
Provide other service support.
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For the Navy, TMR adjusts with deployment cycles rather
than a fleet percentage with PMR. Under PMR a squadron was
either overflying while on deployment and underflying during
stand down. The hours averaged out, but the PMR criteria
did not present a true picture of what was happening. For
the Marine Corps it would be easier to justify the
requirements, as TMR simply states the requirements without
dealing with percentages.
The benefit of the TMR method of computing requirements
due to changes in flying tempo is that the changes can be
quantified in the terms of hours or dollars, which is
essential in equating readiness to resources.
TMR is endorsed by the fleet commanders [Ref. 16] as
they recognize that they would get better support with it.
TMR will not measure readiness any more than PMR as it
is not designed as a measurement system. It does provide a
clear distinction between various parts of the flying hour
program, which interact with operational readiness. Actual
readiness is not developed from syllabus completion alone.
The Center for Naval Analysis [Ref. 16] has shown there is a
direct correlation between performance and numbers of hours
flown. The problem with selling TMR is that it would be
more costly than PMR, and PMR is an accepted definition of
readiness by OSD and Congress.
Another proposal that has received support from the
Secretary of the Navy [Ref. 17] is to provide a flat 25
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hours per month per aircrew. With the exception of patrol
and cargo type aircraft the general consensus among aviators
is that 25 hours per month is adequate to complete and
maintain a high level of readiness.
2. Cost Per Hour
The important issue is communicating the
requirement. This problem ties in somewhat with the Marine
requirements being merged with the Navy requirements, so the
differences of one are lost in the overall picture. When
there is a cost change it must be identified early and
documented well. Follow up is an important factor. This
can be developed with the evolution of a Marine Corps
program. When a requirement is submitted the requirement
can also be submitted to HQMC where the program
representatives can track the requirement through the
system.
Another way would be to use a floating CPH. This would
allow for differences in types of procedures, climate,
terrain, and missions. The problem is that it is open for
possible abuse. It does not encourage conservation when
appropriate. An externality to operating at higher power
settings continuously is that the engines are working harder
and there would be higher associated maintenance costs over
time in addition to higher fuel costs. If a floating CPH




3 . Crew Seat Ratio - Pilot Population
The problem of inaccurate crew seat ratios is a
touchy one and may be difficult to correct. There are
simply too many pilots for the ratios. The simple solution
would be to revalidate the ratios to the actual strength of
the squadrons. This would be difficult to sell as the
ratios are based on a 90 % manning level of the squadron
tables of organization (T/O's) and other factors previously
explained. To revalidate because of changes in strength
would make it, in essence, a floating ratio.
When new aircraft are introduced into the fleet make
sure the crew seat ratios are correct. Stress safety and
the requirement to train new pilots so that they are not too
low. Live with the ratios on aircraft being phased out and
make corrections for the future. Work continuously over
time pressuring for change bit-by-bit.
There may be some justification for revalidation of
some of the ratios, but the main problem lies in the excess
pilots and staff pilots drawing down on the total hours
available. The excess pilot situation is sensitive and in
reality a manpower issue.
The Marine Corps can address the issue and request
additional hours to support the extra pilots, slow the
inputs into the squadrons and let attrition reduce the
numbers, or reassign the extra pilots to non-flying jobs.
Slowing down inputs could have a harmful affect on long
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range readiness and upset the rank structure within the
MOS's.
The T/O's can be changed to incorporate more non-pilots
into the squadrons. There are billets, such as maintenance
officer and administrative officer, that it might be better
to have a ground officer in and available at all times and
not off flying. By having more ground officers less pilots
will needed to be carried.
The Marine Corps would have a hard time justifying a
force structure that calls for extra pilots to be carried.
There is no document or program that justifies it, so there
is no credibility to the analysts and they look upon it as
mismanagement
.
The T/O's can be validated so they are accurate for
current requirements and have any updates implemented into
the OP-20.
4. Staff Hours
The Marine Corps sees the staff pilots as the
first line of combat augmentation to squadrons in a wartime
situation. They would provide the initial surge to bring a
squadron up to 1 00% (assuming the squadron was at the 90%
manning level) of T/0. For this reason planners feel staff
pilots should be treated the same as squadron pilots and
must be fully combat qualified. They should fly on a
regular basis in order to maintain combat proficiency.
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There needs to be a standardized method of determining
the requirements. The PMR criteria would not fulfill the
goals of HQMC. To meet those goals the staff pilot concept
should be done away with and they should be funded for the
same as squadron pilots. TMR could easily incorporate the
change
.
Another way would be to maintain the same 100 hour
requirement but change the model used in the OP-20 so that
the staff are funded at 100% and not 85%.
The number of staff pilots could be fenced at a level
that reduces the impact of the squadrons. The squadrons for
the most part look on staff pilots as an evil that must be
tolerated and would support reductions in staff flying.
Greater usage of simulators, where available, by staff
pilots would reduce the impact on squadron hours.
5 . Simulators
The Marine Corps can follow several possible
courses of action to improve the position of flight
simulator usage.
Revise the FHP to incorporate an increased use of
flight simulators with a goal of 2% of PMR. This
would require procurement of simulators to make them
available to more communities at more air stations.
Have staff pilots utilize simulators more. This would
reduce the impact they have on squadron operations and
help raise the usage rate.
Make sure the stated usage is correct. Franklin [Ref.
I4:p. 46] reported that FMFLANT was understating the
simulator contribution while FMFPAC was overstating it.
By incorporating a recommended [Ref. I4:pp. 59-60] five
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year plan that revised the FHP simulator usage the
contribution would be correctly stated although would
still fall below the 2% rate.
Whether Franklin's plan is followed or if the program
is left in its current state the Marine Corps must make
a well stated justification to the decision makers or
continue to take criticism and potential cuts as in the
POM-87.
6 . Navy-Marine Corps Differences
Using total mission requirements would correct
some of the differences between the Navy and Marine Corps as
it would recognize total requirements and be more sensitive
to changes or differences in operating tempo.
It would be a good idea to continue to develope a
unified Marine Corps flying hour program and supporting
Marine Corps requirements from a higher level would give the
Marine peculiar requirements a better chance of surviving
through NAVCOMPT, OSD, and Congress.
Communication is the most important ingredient in
overcoming any differences. One of the reasons given for
marks to budget requests is that there was insufficient
justification or there was no indicated differences between
the two programs. FMFPAC and FMFLANT should be in agreement
over issues so as to present a united front. HQMC should be
involved in the process to assist when necessary.
The Marine Corps status in the OPTEMPO report needs to
be stated in Marine Corps terms or it may eventually cause
some problems if it becomes a standard of budget execution.
It appears as if shore based units are taking hours from at
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sea units and if there is an attempt to correct the




The real training load should be identified,
including the overhead hours. Numbers are being manipulated
at the expense of training. Align the categories of types
of training with the Navy. For example the Navy does not
have a Instructor Under Training (IUT) category. This would
the reduce additional problem of Navy-Marine Corps
differences that make the understanding of the program that
much more difficult.
8. USMC Policy
Although the Marine Corps is working towards this
end it is important to the FHP that it succeed. The program
is the programs of the two FMF's and not a central Marine
Corp program. It doesn't need to be a central policy;
however the FMF's should standardize and unite as much as
possible. There will be some areas where they can maintain
an independent stand. The stronger front with the support







To ensure a fully combat ready aviation arm of the
Marine Air-Ground Team the flying hour program must have the
fullest support from the highest levels.
2. Fiscal Chain
One considerations would be to have the Marine
Corps totally manage the FHP by incorporating it into the
O&M.MC appropriation. This would overcome many of the
difficulties from being in the 0&M,N chain and give the
Marine Corps control of their own program, but it would
create a number of new problems, aside from being impossible
to sell and implement.
As the CinC's are operational commanders to the FMF ' s
they need assurance the funds are there to support
operational commitments which they can do best by
controlling them.
The Navy owns, funds and controls all the aircraft and
all other aviation assets and would not relinquish
control of the operating funds.
Congress has a difficult enough time trying to
understand three different services' flying hour
programs and would not be too receptive to a fourth.
Making the FMF commanders OPBUD holders in the present
system would work better. The flow of spending authority
should follow the operational chain by giving the immediate
superior the "power of the purse" over subordinate
organizations. As was seen by figures 2-1 and 2-3 the
operational and fiscal chains are different. By making the
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FMF commander an OPBUD holder he would be directly
responsible to the CinC, who is the major claimant.
The FMF has the expertise because they already do all
the functions of an OPBUD holder without the responsibility.
It would give the FMF commander more flexibility in his
program and the opportunity to run it more efficiently.
This change would definitely help FMFPAC as the
geographic (FMFPAC - Hawaii and COMNAVAIRPAC - San Diego)
separation now slows down the process somewhat. CinCPACFLT
is also located in Hawaii.
One drawback would be that the money would be limited.
Now if there is a shortfall or unfunded requirement the FMF
commander can go to the OPBUD holder and request more funds.
Since CNAL and CNAP control much larger budgets than the FMF
alone would there is more likely a chance the extra funds
will be available.
3 . Unit Deployment Crossfunding
TMR would cover the problem of more expensive
operations for a deployed unit from FMFLANT to WESTPAC. As
it now stands funding is based on OP-20 funding for Lant
requirements and costs which are not adequate for deployed
operations where the CPH is higher. Without TMR it would be
a need to address the problem in OP-20 planning.
The problem of CAG's flying a squadron in excess of
planned hours a greater problem in the Pacific Fleet than
in the Atlantic Fleet. In the Pacific Fleet if the CAG
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exceeds planned flying hours the squadron or MAG must cover
the excess at the expense of other squadrons or future
operations, or the squadron might request additional funding
from FMFPAC. FMFPAC, not holding any funds, in turn asks
CNAP or requests to reprogram funds in house. In the
Atlantic if the CAG exceeds planned hours he can go to
directly to CNAL and request more money. CNAL passes the
funds to FMFLANT who in turn passes it on to the squadron.
This is a better better procedure because CNAL has better





It is important that the operators be aware of the
fiscal consequences of their actions and communicate changes
to the wing comptrollers. Fiscal managers should make
efforts to ensure squadron commanders are kept informed and
the commanders operate in a responsible manner.
5 Group Accounting
Some of the aviation supply MOS billets in the MAG
fiscal office could be augmented or replaced by 3415;
Financial Management Officer and 3451 ; Accounting
Technician. The impact would be the large number of
3415/3451's required and it would take time to implement.
The trade off is that not as so many aviation supply
personnel would be needed.
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Expand the current formal training program to include
some accounting and some familiarization with blue dollar
accounting
.
6 . Program Manipulation
The temptation to manipulate hours or reports
would not be so great if squadrons were funded to the
requirement - another argument in favor of TMR. Burton
[Ref. 18] recommends holding squadron commanders more-
accountable by linking budget execution with performance
reports because an evaluation of resource management would
provide incentive for the squadron commander to review and
validate CPH information and fuel consumption.
However, a squadron commander should be left to do what
he is tasked to - prepare his squadron to carry out the
assigned mission. He is an operator and should be given the
opportunity to operate. He should be aware of the link
between dollars and hours and should know how the resources
can work for or restrict him but he should not have it
hanging over his head.
A financial management course should be included in AWS
and Command and Staff College. This would better prepare
future commanders for their roles as resource managers in an
increasingly tighter fiscal atmosphere.
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C. PROGRAM UNDERSTANDING
Replacing PMR with TMR would go a long way in helping
Congress and OSD understand the DON flying hour program.
There would be an initial resistance to change and problems
in having to indoctrinate a new program. In the long run it
would pay off as TMR states what is needed and the false
indications of PMR would be gone. As stated earlier many
consider PMR to be a measure of readiness when it is just a
statement of training requirements.
Another step would be to expand on the Force Readiness
Report (FRR) that's made annually to Congress. There is no
link between resource inputs and expected readiness
outcomes. Although there are no single reports that measure
readiness there are some that could be used to help Congress
understand the affect of funding on force readiness.
Include financial management into formal schools to get
knowledge to the fleet. As a part of the flying hour
program, program managers could carry the gospel to the
field in the form of pilot training. If every pilot were
aware of the funding procedures and policies he might be
encouraged to utilize flight time more productively.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
When the Marine Corps was able to fully execute the
budgeted flying hours in the early 1980 f s the FMF
s
designated flying hour program managers to coordinate the
program. During the following years the program has grown
and has accomplished a lot. During the course of this study
it became apparent that there is more to be accomplis-hed
with the flying hour program, and the independent FMF
programs that have been developed will evolve into a united
Marine Corps program.
The program is underfunded for the Marine Corps to meet
its desired level of readiness and to conduct non-training
missions. Simply raising the investment in the program will
not necessarily meet those ends and there is not an adequate
method of accurately measuring the return on the dollar.
The program must be made more efficient from within to make
it more effective.
The program methodology for determining the
requirements is outdated and confusing. Using total mission
requirements instead of primary mission readiness is a big
step in the right direction. The Marine Corps needs to
ensure the requirements are stated correctly and well
justified. If the justification and methodology accurately
state the needs the overall funding requirements will be
98
greater. It will then be up to the decision makers to
decide on funding the program.
Changing the funds flow to follow the operational chain
of command and giving the FMF commander the responsibility
for his budget will improve the efficiency of the execution.
The improved flexibility should be recognized in increased
readiness
.
Communication is the key to a well run program.
Communicating the need for a responsibly executed program to
the fleet gets the operators involved in the program.
However the squadrons should be funded at a level so they
are free to work towards their goals and not be so fiscally
constrained that readiness suffers or they try to beat the
system. The decision makers in Congress, OSD, and SECNAV
must understand the Marine Corps peculiar requirements in
order to give them favorable support. This can be worked
toward through a united and well run program.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A: O&M.N Authorizations FY82-87 (in millions)
FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87
$19,581,697 $20,880,928 $22,292,928 $25,334.7 $25,072.5 $25,688.5









































OVERALL FY86 2,442,353 2,204,204 90.25


















TOT USMC FY86 364,819 306,845 84.11 1770 644.809 545.403 903.5





TABLE C: TACAIR Hours actual (reported) or planned FY81-FY87
FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87
ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL APPR BUDGET POM
MARINE 259,864 254,429 253,249 285,309 288,156 306,845 322,721
NAVY 591,272 583,248 579,516 591,770 610.364 627,902 651,703
851,136 837,677 833,665 877,079 898,520 934,752 974,424
TABLE D: Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) in percentage of PMR required.














































FY 1986 ESTIMATE FY 1987 POM













1.3 85.2 87.3 87.8 86.5 87.3

























AVDLRS - Aviation Depot Level Repairables.
mid-year FY85.
Came out of stock fund until
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APPENDIX B
THE OP-20 AND FLYING HOUR INPUT STRUCTURE
A . The OP-20:
The Operations Plan 20 or OP-20 is the basic report of
the flying hour projection system. Coming from OSD in the
mid 70's the OP-20 is now put together by the Navy/Marine
Corps Flying Hour Program Coordinator (N0P-51C) under the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare), 0P-05, who
is also the Resource Sponsor for aviation funding.
Developed from the analysis of historical data and projected
requirements submitted by Navy and Marine Corps units, it
provides commanders with guidance concerning annual
authorized number of flight hours that may be flown by each
type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft, and it provides the
dollar amount to be budgeted for each aircraft flight hour
by T/M/S along with the dollar totals for the fiscal year.
It is published three times a year;
May; POM outyear controls. This gives
commanders an opportunity to respond with inputs if
they feel the requirements do not reflect their
actual requirements.
- Sep/Oct; OSD FY Final funding schedule for the
Budget Year.
Jan/Feb; History Final for the completed Fiscal Year
The OP-20 is broken down into "Schedules" or primary
missions. Those schedules are:
1 01
Schedule A - TACAIR/ASW; Currently funded at 85% of
primary mission requirements.
Schedule B - Fleet air training; Fleet Readiness
Squadrons (FRS). Requirements are generated by a
fixed training syllabus generated by the Aviation
Manpower & Training Division and funded at 100%.
Schedule C - Fleet air support, strategic air,
environmental predict ion( weather ); those aicraft that
provide support so aircrews can stay operational.
Schedule D - Reserves, CNET, Recruiting, NAVEUR.
B. POM Submission ;
The POM OP-20 is presented to the Resouce Sponsor,
OP-05 for aviation, where the OP-20 is balanced against
fleet proposals and the Defense Guidance. If requirements
are too much OP-05 decides where to make cuts. OP-05 puts
together the budget proposal and submits it to the
Appropriation Sponsor, the Program Planning Office (0P-90),
where all the POM's are evaluated to see they comply with
the Defense Guidance, the programs have justification, and
are defendable to OSD. From there the POM is sent to OSD
where it goes through analysis. After the analysis, the
Secretary of Defense holds a series of budget hearings
jointly with the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) on
the requests. These hearings are used by SECDEF to
formulate his Program Budget Decisions (PBD's). The
services can make comments that can be used by OSD to revise
the PBD's. The budget estimate is finalized and is
102
submitted to OMB for incorporation into the President's
budget
.
C . How OP-20 can be used by commanders ;
The OP-20 defines a maximum number of flight hours to
be flown by T/M/S. The FMF commander ultimately decides on
the hours to be flown in view of mission requirements. The
Wing G-3 is responsible for total wing flight operations,
and provides the group commanders with flying hour ceilings
that reflect wing operational goals and objectives.
For the operational commander it is a question of
balance between dollars and operations. Usually operators
feel they can fly more than budgeted so they must compare
the allocations with their own plans and adjust accordingly.
There are often several courses a commander can pursue.
Fly as they have planned, requesting additional funds
later on, and fly to their own target. Here they
risk having to shut down flight operations early if
suplemental funding does not come about. This
occurred to the 3rd MAW at the end of FY85.
Fly at a reduced pace and stay within the budget.
Trade off between T/M/S - let the cheaper to operate
aircraft fly more hours at the expense of more
expensive high performance aircraft. There is a risk
of a reduction of expertise in the high performance
aircraft
.
Change the type of flying. Restrict operations that
consume high rates of fuel so as to reduce the cost
per hour. This risks not getting maximum utilization
of training time.
Use the budget as a standard by which to operate.
This would be considered fiscally sound but it





































HOURS COMPUTATIONS - TACAIR
1. NUMBER OF AVERAGE AIRCRAFT* X CREW SEAT RATIO - NUMBER OF CREWS
2. NUMBER OF CREWS X HOURS/CREW/MONTH X 12 = PRIMARY MISSION HOURS
3. STAFF HOURS/# OF AVERAGE AIRCRAFT X # OF AVERAGE AIRCRAFT - STAFF HOURS
4. PRIMARY MISSION HRS + STAFF HOURS = REQUIRED HOURS
5. REQUIRED HOURS X PMR MASTER** = (BUDGETED HRS + PAY BACK SIMULATOR)
6. (BUDGETED HRS + PAY BACK SIMULATOR) ' - PAY BACK SIMULATOR = BUDGETED HOURS
* Projected average over a two year period, by T/M/S.
** The CNO percentage. For TACAIR it is 85% - 87%.
1 Pay Back Simulator is a cost avoidance offset for simulator usuage. The
simulator usuage is a percentage of the overall flying hours and the hours
calculated at step 5 are reduced by that amount.


















30 1.25 37.5 25 11,250 711 600 11,850
GROSS OFFSET
EQUTRED PMR BUDGET SIMULATOR BUDGET
HOURS X MASTER = HOURS - HOURS - HOURS
11,850 .88 10,428 711 9,717
9,717 = 82%
711 = 6% *
10,428 = 88% PMR
*This is an example.
Simulator contribution to




1. CONSOLIDATED $/BBL = (0SD$/JP4 X FC%) + (OSD$/JP5 X FC%)
2. HOURLY FUEL COSTS = CONSOLIDATED $/BBL X HOURLY FUEL CONSUMPTION
RATE BY T/M/S
3. HOURLY OTHER COSTS (PRESENT YEAR) = HOURLY OTHER COSTS (PREVIOUS YEAR)
X ESCALATION X (PRESENT YEAR)
4. COST/HR = HOURLY FUEL COSTS + HOURLY OTHER COSTS + DLR COSTS/HR
5. TOTAL COSTS REQUIRED = REQUIRED HOURS X COST/HR
6. TOTAL COSTS BUDGETED = BUDGETED HOURS X COST/HR
$/BBL - Price per barrel of fuel
BBL - Barrel of fuel
OSD$ - OSD supplied price of a particular grade of jet fuel ^.either JP4 or 5
FC% - Funding Category percentage of use for the grade of fuel. For FY86
computations it was 147 for JP4 and 867Q for JP5.
DLR - Depot level repairables
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APPENDIX C
MARINE CORPS INDICATORS OF AVIATION READINESS
A. EVALUATIONS :
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) ;
Applies to both air and ground units for team and unit
training. Used to develope training programs and combat
training and is a basis to evaluat unit proficiency.
Deployable units are evaluated every 18 months, others every
24 months.
After Action Reports ; Used as evaluation aids to highlight
strengths and weaknesses when particpating in training
exercises. The Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at
Twenty Nine Palms is used to conduct combined arms training
which is evaluated against MCCRES performance statdards.
B. TRAINING STANDARDS AND GOALS ;
NAVAL AIR TRAINING AND OPERATING PROCEDURES (NATOPS) ;
Annual Navy evaluations of individual and unit compliance
with NATOPS. " Evaluate individual Navy and Marine pilot,
flight officer or crewmember. Determine-s whether or not a
pilot a pilot is qualified, conditionally qualified, or
unqualified. Provide objective look at strengths and
weaknesses of training program.
Marine Corps Aviation Training and Readiness Manual
;
Standardizes aviation training and specifies flight
qualification performance requirements for aircrews by type/
model aircraft. Prescribes the number of sorties and tasks
to be accomplisged , and maximum amount of time between
flights before demonstrated proficiency is expected to
degrade (currency). Defines the Primary Mission Readiness
areas. The percentage of completion of the prescribed
syllabus is the basic information by which the Flying Hour
Program is funded.
Fully Combat Qualified - 100$ of training complete and
current
Combat Capable - 60$ of training complete
C MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PROJECT INITIATIVES :
Aviation Training and Readiness Information System (ATRIMS)
;
A Marine Corps unique special purpose training management
107
tool designed and developed specifically for the aircrew
training manager in aviation units. ATRIMS is a limited use
system that utilizes T&R standards and inputs from FREDS and
other 'data as desired to provide the squadron/detachment
commander with the following capabilities:
- uses existing data to update flight training
requirements
.
- provides forecasts for training requirements.
- assists in daily scheduling of individual flight and
ground training.
- assists in meeting daily flight currency and
proficiency objectives.
- assists in verifying performance standards.
- provide data for reporting Combat Readiness Percentage
(CRP) to higher command.
Flight Readiness Evaluation Data System (FREDS) ; The Marine
Corps' basic aviation combat readiness reporting system, it
is a Marine Corps unique automated data system designed to
collect flight activity data on aircraft and crews. It is
used to analyze and report flight activity to all levels of
command from squadrons to HQMC staff agencies. It provides
commands with the capability of mainitaining complete
records on individual aircrewmen and aircraft by
type°/model/ser ies . Commanders use it to develope readiness
assesment of pilots, crews, and„units. FREDS is interfaced
the T&R Manual to provide task accomplishment data from




FY-83 PILOT STATUS REPORT AS OF 30 SEP 83
TOTAL LTCOL MAJOR CAPT UEUT
REO 0/a +/- REQ O/B + /- REQ O/B +/- REQ O/B +/- REQ 0/B +/-
F/W SU8T0T 1493 1463 -30 166 278 +112 341 456 +115 478 530 +52 508 199 -309
INOIV 258 328 7 14 33 35 204 293
F/W TOTAL 1751 1791 +40 173 278 +105 355 456 +101 511 565 +54 712 492 -220
R/W SUBTOT 1909 2072 +163 175 206 +31 399 474 +75 587 847 +260 748 545 -203
INOIV 260 144 7 16 27 5 210 139
R/W TOTAL 2169 2216 +47 182 206 +24 415 474 +59 614 852 +238 958 684 -274
TOTAL PILOT 3920 4007 +87 355 484 +129 770 930 +160 1125 1417+292 1670 1176 -494
PROJECTED PILOT INVENTORY VS REQUIREMENTS
(NO ADJUSTMENT TO PTR FY84 THROUGH FY90)
FISCRl YEflR 93 84 85 8G 87 88 89 90
TOTRL GRINS(PTR) 441 480 500 500 500 500 500 500
TOTRL LOSSES 186 362 470 474 477 479 482 484
(attrition rate) .0488 .0890 .1125 .1125 .1125 .1125 .1125. .1125
NET GRIN/LOSS +255 +118 +30 +26 +23 +21 +18 +16
REQUIREMENT 3920 3929 3996 4050 4044 4085 4106 4249
BEGIN FY INVENT 3807 4062 4181 4210 4237 4260 4281 4299




ADMINISTERING OFFICE; The Headquarters Command which is
responsible for budgeting, accounting, reporting, and
controlling obligations and assigned expenditures for
programs financed under an appropriation or subdivision of
an appropriation. Also referred to as Claimant/Subclaimant
.
AIRCRAFT PROGRAM DATA FILE (APDF); A secret programming
document published three times per year by OP-508, and is
used by the Aviation Supply Office to determine the number
of spare parts needed to support the number of aircraft
programmed into the fleet. The number of spares is
determined by projected hours, not just aircraft totals.
ALLOCATION; An authorization by a designated official of a
component of the Department of Defense making funds
available within a prescribed amount to an operating agency
for the purpose of making allotments.
APPROPRIATION; An act of Congress that allows federal
agencies to incur obligations and make payments from the
Treasury for specified purposes.
AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLES (AVDLR's); Also referred
to as DLR's, they are the replenishment spare parts to
support the fleet aircraft. Until April 1985 new spares
were purchased from the procurement appropriation and
repairable items were reworked by the depot maintenance
activities and financed by the 0&M,N account, but not
charged against the Flight Hour Program. Free issues of
these spares were made to the operating commands. Under the
current system begun in April 1985 aviation commands
purchase replenishment parts, new and rebuilt,, from the
stock fund using funds budgeted for in the OFC 50 budget.
BUDGET; A document which expresses in financial and
descriptive terms a plan for accomplishing an organization's
objectives during a specific period of time. It is an
instrument of planning, decision-making and management
control. The budget is also and instrument of fiscal policy
and a statement of national priorities.
BUDGET AUTHORITY; Authority provided by law to enter into
obligations which generally result in immediate or future
outlays of Government funds.
1 10
COMBAT READINESS PERCENTAGE (CRP); The percentage of a
specific tactical aircraft flight sylabus in which
aeronautically designated personnel (ADP) are proficient.
Proficiency is a measure of achievement of a specific skill
by actual demonstraion of that skill as established by the
Marine Corps T&R Manual for each type/model aircraft. CRP's
have been divided into four basic categories based on the
total percentage of proficiency ADP's have demonstrated
within their respective syllabi as shown below:
Combat Capable - 60 percent CRP
Combat Ready - 70 percent CRP
Combat Qualified - 85 percent CRP
Full-Combat Qualified - 100 percent CRP
COST CENTER; A subdivision of a field activity or a
responsibility center. It is an organizational entity for
which identification of costs is desired and which is
amenable to cost control through one responsible supervisor.
For 0&M,MC allocations it is called a Planning Estimate
Holder and is the smallest entity within the FMF OPBUD which
exercises direct financial management responsibility.
CREW SEAT RATIO; The relationship of how many pilots are
assigned to fly and takes into account those events such as
leave ,. sickness and injury.
EXPENDITURE; A charge against available funds. It is
evidenced by'voucher, claim, or other document approved by
competent authority. Expenditure represents the actual
payment of funds.
EXECUTION; The operation of carrying out a program as
contained in approved budget. Often referred to as "Budget
Execution"
.
FULL MISSION CAPABLE (FMC); Hours which an aircraft has all
of its associated systems fully operational and capable of
performing all assigned missions. Calculated as a
percentage of the total hours available in a month and
aggragated for the entire squadron of aircraft.
FISCAL YEAR (FY); Accounting period beginning 1 October and
ending 30 September of the following year. The fiscal year
is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. The
Fiscal Year 1987 begins on 1 October 1986 and ends on 30
September 1987.
FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM (FYDP); The Five-Year Defense
Program summarizes all approved programs of the entire
Department of Defense. Resources or inputs required for
1 1 1
five years are combined with military outputs or programs
for the same period. The FYDP is expressed in terms of
programs, program elements and resource catagories.
FORCE STRUCTURE; The number of aircraft assigned to
individual units. Fixed by the Aircraft Procurement Plan
(APP)
.
MAJOR CLAIMANT/SUBCLAIMANT; A major claimant is a
bureau/of f ice/command/Headquarters , Marine Corps which is
designated as an administering office under the Operation
and Maintenance appropriations in NAVCOMPT Manual, Volume 2,
Chapter 2. Subclaimants are bureaus/offices/commands
designated as administering offices which receive a
subclaimant operating budget from a major claimant.
MISSION CAPABLE(MC); Hours in which an aircraft is capable
of performing at least one of its assigned missions.
Calculated as a percentage of the total hours available in a
month and aggragated for the entire squadron of aircraft.
OBLIGATION; A duty to make a future payment of money. The
duty is incurred as soon as an order is placed. It is not
necessary that goods actually be delivered, or services
actually be performed, before the obligation is created;
neither is it necessary that a bill, or invoice, be received
first. The placement of an order is sufficient. An
obligation legally encumbers a specified sum of money which
will- require outlay(s) or expendi ture( s) in the future.
OP-20; Operations Plan 20. A DON planning document
published by the Navy/Marine Corps Flying Hour Program
Coordinator (N0P-51C) several times a year to establish the
annual flying hours by T/M/S, and is used for FHP funding
and fleet planning. Requirements are computed by using
historical data and revised with Fleet inputs. The OP-20
shows; required hours computed from factors of Primary
Mission Readiness( PMR) requirements, crew seat ratios, force
structure, and staff hours; budgeted hours computed as a
percentage of PMR; cost per hour by T/M/S; total costs by
budget line item; and total costs
OPERATING TARGETS (OPTARs); An estimate of the amount of
money which will be required by an operating ship, staff,
squadron, or other unit to perform the tasks and functions
assigned. Commanding officers may give subordinates a
degree of financial responsibility paralleling their other
responsibilities by the administrative procedure of issuing
operating targets (OPTARs) for funds that are planned for
utilazation by the subordinate commander. OPTARs are
administrative limitations and not legal subdivisions of
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funds, and the issuing commander retains all legal and
accounting responsibility.
OUTLAYS; Checks issued, interest accrued on the public
debt, or other payments, net of refunds and reimbursements.
Total budget outlays consist of the sum of the outlays from
appropriations and funds in the budget, less receipts.
PLANNING ESTIMATE HOLDER; A cost center in the FMF for
managing O&M.MC funds.
PRIMARY MISSION READINESS (PMR); Those hours required to
maintain the average flight crew qualified and current to
perform the primary mission of the assigned aircraft; to
include all weather/day/night carrier operations as
appropriate.
PROGRAM OBJECTIVES MEMORANDUM (POM); A memorandum in
prescribed format submitted to the Secretary of Defense by
the Secretary of a Military Department which recommends the
total resource requirements within the parameters of the
Secretary of Defense fiscal guidance.
RAMP-UP; Accelerating a program such as the Flight Hour
Program to achieve overall objectives. As an example FMFPAC
moved 25$ of 4th quarter funds to the first three quarters
so as to fly to the operational objectives.
RESOURCES; Resources consist of military and civilian
personnel, material on hand and on order, and the
entitlement to procure or use material, utilities, and
services
.
RESPONSIBILITY CENTER; An organization unit headed by an an
officer who is responsible for the management of resources
in the unit, and who in most instances, can significantly
influence the expenses incurred in the unit. The lowest
level holding legal and accounting responsibility under
Section 1517 - the Operating Budget Holder. COMNAVAIRPAC
and COMNAVAIRLANT are the Responsible Centers for 0&M,N
Operating Budgets. FMFPAC/LANT are the Responsible Centers
for 0&M,MC Operating Budgets.
RESPONSIBLE OFFICE; The Headquarters Command which is
responsible for budgeting, accounting and reporting the
totality of an appropriation. CNO is the responsible office
for the 0&M,N Appror iat ion.
STEAMING DAYS; Number of days a ship is cruising with its
main engines running. Used as a measure of resource
consumption.
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SUBORDINATE COMMAND; In the FMF it is one of the major
elements of the FMF such as a wing, division, or FSSG.
SUPPORT TAIL; The spare parts in the supply system required
to sustain a given tempo of flight operations so aircraft
are not grounded due to a spare part not being available.
TYPE/MODEL/SERIES ( TMS ) ; The specific designation of
aircraft used by the military and used by the DON flight
hour program for planning and funding. Type refers to the
mission of the aircraft such as attack (A), fighter (F),
etc.. Model refers to the particular airframe in that
mission category such as an A-4 or F-4. The series is a
particular configuration within the model such as an A-4E or
A-4M, or an F-4N or F-4S. The series indicates equipment
that is installed on board that gives it individual mission
or performance capabilities. In most cases the higher the
letter designator - the newer the series. This is not
always true such as in the case of the CH-46E which followed
the CH-46F series.
UNITREP; Unit Status and Identity Report. A management
information system used by the JCS to monitor status of
military units. Units report in terms of combat readiness
ratings C-1 to C-5 designed to measure the units ability to
perform its wartime tasks by assissing the peacetime
availability and status of resources possessed or controlled
by the unit in the four resource areas of personnel,
equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and
training. The C-ratings are;
C-1 fully combat ready
C-2 substantially combat ready
C-3 marginally combat ready
C-4 not combat ready
C-5 service programmed not combat ready
WEAPON SYSTEM PLANNING DOCUMENT (WSPD); A confidentail
document published by NAVAIR on an irregular schedule every
12-18 months. It shows the aircraft procurement and
delivery schedule and the distribution of those aircraft. It
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